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MEETING POINT: Glyn Ford
Glyn Ford is the leader of the 45-strong.
European Parliamentary labour Party and
also Deputy leader of the Socialist Group in '
the European Parliament, Coming. from a part
of the United Kingdom (Greater Manchcstcr)
with a large minority population, hI: has sl:l:n
at first hand how racial prejudice can poison
the atmosphere and provoke tl:ilsion and
fears: it has made him a strong opponent or
racism and xenophobia for many Yl:ars. It was
no surprise when he was appointed Rap-
porteur for the EP's Committee of Inquiry
into Racism and Xenophobia. Pages 2 to 5.
COUNTRY REPORTS
FIJI: The pe,tceful coexistence of
two major cultures - Fijian and
Indian was seen by many as the
decisive factor in making Fiji a
rdatively well-off developing
country since it gained independence
in !l)70. Yet in 19X7. two successive
coups put an end to its reputation as
a model multiracial society. While
many changes have affected political
life, including a new Constitution promulgated in July 1990. the economy
too has been reoriented. Pages 9 to 21.
TONGA : Internal pressure for change seems
to be building up in a, so far. unusually
conservative and stable Tonga. While many a
Pacific neighbour has been faced with socio-
political upheavals in the petst few years. the
last of the Polynesian kingdoms seemed
protected from the winds of change that blew
elsewhere. Yet now, the powers of its mon-
archy. judged by many to be the most
extensive in the world. are being questioned by
many commoners in search of greater de-
mocracy and more accountability in govern-
ment, Pages 22 to 33.
DOSSIER: Iwamigr3tion
Immigration  an awkward subject from a
development perspective for Member States? The
debate on the issue has come to the fore as the
Community prepares to abolish its internal
frontiers in 1993, and at a time ofless favourable
economic outlook. The Courier publishes a series
of articles and points of view as a contribution 
this debate. Pages  40  to 77.
DEVELOPING WORLD
More than a billion human beings do not have a dollar a day for their
livelihood. Why'! This is the question the World Bank asks in its latest
report on development in the world. The answer should be sought in the
interaction between the State and the market to promote development.
Pages 82 to 83.
How are the people faring?' The UNDP world report on human
development brings a message of hope: it is political bankruptcy and not
lack of financial resources that is responsible for the devaluation of
human life. Pages 84 to 87.
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The debate on immigration is a
powder keg. It is not that the govern-
- ments and peoples of the Community
have become anti-immigrant in prin-
ciple. If things are turning sour, it is
because there is a problem ~ a real
problem.
Whatever their legal status and
wherever they come from, foreigners
on national soil have always been
seen in varying lights. The opinion in
the Community at the moment is that
the economic capacity for welcoming
new inhabitants from outside has
virtually reached saturation point 
and many of those who have already
settled here, it is suggested, have not
yet been fully integrated. So the
discussion, which turns, roughly on
the number and degree of involve.
ment of foreigners in society, is real
complex and inevitable. The same is
true of the solutions but these still
have to be found. And since immig-
ration is a problem which goes
beyond both the national and the
Community framework, effective-
ness is not just the affair of the
Member States or the Community as
su(h. Immigration is 'international'
as Bernard Kouchner, for one, has
said, and the Community is no more
a fortress' in this than in economic
matters. Every Member State has its
immigrant 'suppliers' which tend to
follow the same historical, economic
and even cultural patterns. The links
are almost magnetic.
Another important point is the
democratic deficit  or in many
cases, the complete absence of de-
mocracy in the countries of origin; a
fact which tends only to be brought
up in discussions about political
~ refugees. But it is obvious that
~ altho,ugh economic considerations
E always crop up, they are not the
fi. 'whole story and that, basically, econ-
Several generatiolls of immigrants m'e ilwolved in the ecommdc and social life oftfte  omic developments are determined
Community. On Belgium s National holiday, Africans, Arabs and others millgle ii! the  more by political systems than the
crowd. Here, a mother weal'ing tile traditional headscmi displays the Belgiem flag  OJ! converse. The 'democratic deficit'
the push-chair, while her other children have clearly opted for western style gar/;,  ~~Y ~ell have discouraged econoll!ic
l1!tegration is lIot just a political issue  there is also the 'generation-gap ml~lative and helped speed up emig-
ratIOn. As the poet put It
, '
poverty
seems to bear down less harshly in thesun' but it is ever more tolerable when
accompanied by freedom and de-
mocracy. So economic difficulties are
not the only reason for the migratory
pressure being put on the Com-
munity from all four corners of the
world.
The big question, therefore, is what
the Community is going to do with
the millions of foreigners installed
entirely legally, on its territory ~ an
~nding a proper, permanent answer
IS no easy matter.
The debate on the place and role of
foreigners goes back a long way. The
Greeks and Romans, and later the
Christians, thought foreigners were
barbarians and Rome, according to
the historian Bossuet, even became
their prey . What did the Romans do
then? And what can the Community
do now? As DilUte said about the
Romans' solution in the ' Divine
Comedy What are we going to do
now the barbarians aren t there any
more? They may have been the so-
lution 
This dossier, long-planned but
aPl?ear!ng at .a time when immig-
ratIOn IS a major governmental con-
cern, is not an ethical discussion but
an investigation of the techn'ical
historical and cultural aspects of th~
question. 0 LUCIEN PAGNI
Dossier s content
Readers will find hereafter a major
historical article by Claude-Valentin
Marie, a sociologist who specialises in
immigration matters, followed by a
description by the UN Organisation
for International Migration, of the
world trends in migration (B. Ghosh)
and two official views by the Rt. Ron.
MrsA. Rumbold M.P. (Home Office)
and l.R. Matheson, Chairman of the
ACP Committee of Ambassadors
(Brussels). We also publish the views
of a Turkish immigrant residing in
Germany and of EP and Ese con-
ferences on the subject. (See also, the
interview with Glyn Ford on page 2.
A second series of articles describes
the economic, social and cultural
aspects of immigration.
Finally, we reproduce a chart on the
origins and the size of the resident
non-European population in the
12 Member States.
Immigration  an awkward  issue
by Claude-Valentin MARIE (*
They are not foreigners and not really
immigrants either, yet they do come from
somewhere else  the Caribbean and so
their culture is a paradox in which they
juggle with the reality, values and culture
of France, adding a flavour of their own.
This long-played game may give us a
chance (an irony of history, this) to bring
the idea of paradox back into French
thinking on the subject of, if not immig"
ration then certainly assimilation.
Indeed, many people see this as the only
way to solve the problems.
Let us start with assimilation and
above all, with those positive claims o
assimilation by devotees of Caribbean
identity. This is not what it seems. It is not
just one more expression of their culture
of paradox, but a more fundamental need
to make clear that there is no conflict
between assimilation and difference, any
more than there is necessarily a corre-
lation between assimilation  integ-
ration v. difference-exclusion. In this
light, assimilation is a people s oppor-
tunity or indeed its right to drink at every
fountain in the world and to nurture its
own special genius  which will only
flourish, in its difference, if there is
dialogue and if there is exchange.
Having underlined this positive dimen-
sion, let us say straight away that the
characteristic ambiguity of the Caribbean
reality does not always work quite so
positively and that it is not always a
benefit to the West Indians. One example
of this is the everyday experience of
people from Guadeloupe and Marti-
nique, who are often treated as 'foreign
immigrants' in . France, although they
have always been and in many cases have
always wanted to be French. They may
have been slaves more than 300 years
ago, but they are French and they have
been French citizens for a very long time.
Slavery was abolished in 1848, but it is
still alive in everyone s memory. Yet after
abolition - and this is another paradox
former male slaves _coulc1 join the
community of citizens, whl1'e fema:le
slaves in France and the colonies could
not, a situation which lasted for some
time.
) The author is a sociologist. His article is
published with the kind permission of ' Evenement
Eufopeen , 62 bvd Garibaldi, F,750l5 Paris, France.
These one or two historical facts help
situate the ideas discussed in this article
in which we attempt to decide who is
foreign and who is not, who is an
immigrant and who is not and who
assimilates who and what as well as to .
determine who is a citizen and who is not
- or, more precisely, to what extent
nationality is the necessary and sufficient
condition for full access to the status of
citizen.
But things are not as simple as they
seem. The status of citizen and the
enjoyment of the attendant rights have
never been given clearly or once and for
all. They are neither consubstantials of
nationality nor exclusively based on a
principle of territoriality (I). They are
first and foremost, the prize of democracy
and democracy has to go on fighting for
them today, as is clear (paradoxically)
from the increasing tendency for citizens
to decline to use their civic and political
rights and for non-nationals who do not
enjoy such rights to.set too much store by
them. The call for votes for foreigners
(benefiting from an extension of the
rights of citizenship without actually
claiming them by obtaining the relevant
nationality and swearing total allegiance
to the sovereignty of the State) is a perfect
illustration of this. It reflects the need for
some and the risk for others of a complete
overhaul of democratic organisation-
manifestation to bring it into line with the
changes in the organic composition of
our societies. Although the idea seems
legitimate and therefore a distinct poss-
ibility for nationals of Northern States
the same is by no means true in the case o
foreigners from the South  hence the
issue is not just voting rights for fore-
igners, but voting rights for all foreigners.
The 'Others' and the fantasy of
the Others
Let us use the example of Caribbean
immigration in France again to stress the
relative value of ideas of nationality and
citizenship and foreigner and immigrant.
(I) Remember votes for women, for example. and
the two categories of voters during the colonial era in
Algeria, where citizens were divided into those of
French origin, who were in voters' college one. and
the rest, who were in voters' college two and had
fewer rights.
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and citizenship therefore, created a ra-
dical difference between people who came
in from the Caribbean and immigrants
from elsewhere. It was particularly clear
on  the job market. Although both groups
were called on to perform the same
economic functions, the nationality dis-
tinction made it possible to put them into
different sectors of activity and prevented
(for a long while) any real competition
between them.
The foreign workers, some of them ex-
nationals who had become foreign (Al-
gerians, for example), were systematically
channelled into unskilled jobs in the
private sector. The others, West Indians
who were nationals but immigrants
nonetheless, were recruited  en masse  into
the public sector, always to do unskilled
work.
The big difference between the two was ~
not so much income as status (2)  that ~
status of civil servant, which the West ~
Indians saw as a symboUending credence ~
to their illusion of never being taken for
socially underprivileged foreign immigr-
ants. However strong this illusion may
have been, it was powerless to neutralise
the real effects ofthe identical incomes of
the two groups and, in a social set-up
where everything had to be paid for, it
brought home the reality - which in this
case meant the relations of proximity
(and the tendency to take one for the
other attendant on virtually identical
housing prospects).
When West Indians look for some-
where to live, they soon find out that the
man in the street cannot really tell them
from immigrants from Africa. He
classifies them both as black and makes
no distinction between them when refus-
ing what he often sees as unreasonable
demands. The distinction which West
Indians thought was taken as read on the
job market does not therefore apply to
housing and, far from keeping apart from
the 'foreigners' with whom they were
anxious not to be lumped, they find
themselves stuck together with them in
the same low"cost housing in the same
suburbs and seen as being part of the
same immigrant society. Their ideas of
dissociation and separation are as no-
thing and their behaviour towards the
real' foreigners - i.e. Africans and
North Africans  is highly disagreeable
(') Renault.s workers did not necessarily earn less
than welfare nurses in Paris or people in ministries.
meeting point for Africans in Brussels
, '
Capital of Europe . The signboard and
name ()f the area are wl"itte1! in fingala (language spoken in the Congo, Zaire and
part afCentral Afdca). 'Nganda means 'pub' and 'Matol1gl!' is tile name of the
most popular area ill Kinshasa (Zaii'
as a result. Many West Indians take
French rejection and go one better. They
hope not to be thought of as foreigners
themselves and so their relations with the
Others' are never direct , but advertised
via the fantasy of the Others.
This brings us to the more specifically
racialist aspect of our subject. The
following questions are the basis for our
discussion - How do the victims of
racialism behave? How do they person-
ally process what is said about them?
What picture do they form of themselves
and the others from what the dominant
group says about them 
The case of West Indians, especially
from Martinique, is very telling here.
From the start of the colonial era, they
had better schooling than was available in
other colonies and some of them were
soon able to obtain posts of responsibility
(including as governors) in Africa. The
Africans were supposed to . be their
cousins, but the West -rndiandJfficials
behaviour towards them was far worse
than that of the wbite colonials, because
they were violently opposed to the idea of
being taken for 'inferior' Blacks by the
Whites. They saw the Blacks not for what
they were, but through the eyes of a third
party, the Whites, whom they hoped and
tried to be like. This is entirely typical of
the sort of relations which the colonial
situation generated.
Immigration to some extent embodies
this three-way model inherited from the
colonial era. It has been made more
complex over the past 10 years by the
changes which have affected 'foreign
immigration - a misnomer if ever there
was one, because, as already mentioned
many of those who came to work and
then settled in France were not foreigners
in the first place and as many more, who
were foreign at the time or became so in
the interim, are not now. The case of the
Algerians is typical. Before independence
(1962), they migrated as French
nationals, free to move about the national
territory as they liked, but with indepen-
dence, they automatically became for-
eigners. However, the Algerian com-
munity which settled in France is now
partly of French nationality again be-
cause of the children born there and this
of course affects immigrants from the
Caribbean. As long as the Algerians were
actually foreign and, as such, denied
access to the civil service, they were nocompetition for the West Indians in this
respect, but this is no longer the case.
Unlike their parents, West Indian
youngsters (born in France or the Carib-
bean) who want to join the civil service
service now have to compete with per-
fectly legitimate competition from
youngsters who were born in France of
Algerian parents and are therefore
French and on an equal footing with all
other nationals when it comes to applying
for jobs as public servants.
Unfindable immigration policies
Since many once-foreign migrants
have obtained or regained French nation-
ality and since both the French and
foreigners who came now have children
most of whom were born in France and
are of French nationality, what looked
like a problem of foreigners is in fact
more and more one of French popu-
lations offoreign origin. So when we talk
about immigration, whom do we mean?
Do we mean foreigners? If so, which
ones? Do we mean immigrants? And can
children born in France be immigrants?
The 1982 census showed that 25% of
foreigners living in France were actually
born there, as were 40% ofunder-18s of
foreign parentage and 80% of all under-
10s. These figures are of course outdated
but they point up the extent of the change
in immigration since 1974. Many saw the
decision of the French authorities (and all
European governments) to suspend or
halt worker immigration as a major break
with the past and it indeed was a turning
point in the country s employment policy
- although certainly not its immigration
policy.
Bringing in foreigners is not necessarily
running an immigration policy and run-
ning an immigration policy is not neces-
sarily bringing in foreign workers.
Labour policy and immigrant policy are
not to be confused, as the case of
Germany so clearly shows.
In the early 1960s when the Berlin Wall
went up, the source of migrants from East
Germany dried up. The Federal Republic
encouraged its businessmen to go in for
massive recruitment of foreigners and
therefore signed more bilateral agree-
ments to cater for its shortage of labour
and ensure that the economy expanded.
However, the German authorities were
very clear about the fact that these
agreements (the one with Turkey is a case
in point) were labour agreements and
--'----.-.------.--.--,------------------
nothing to do with immigration - a clear
principle which, however (another para-
dox), failed to save Germany from the
impasse in which it is currently defending
the unrealistic principle of a labour policy
which makes nO reference to an immig-
ration policy and even less to the Turkish
population living on its territory.
The German concept of nation, people
and community is behind an attitude
which rejects all idea of foreign workers
and their families settling permanently on
German soil (and ultimately becoming
naturalised) and the State refuses any sort
of integration policy for populations it
feels should go back where they came
from. As a result, the 2.5 to 3 million
Turks in Germany have never been called
immigrants. They are 'guest workers' and
the fact that they have been there for 20
years has not prevented the German
Chancellor from saying that 'Germany is
not a country of immigration , thereby
emphasising the discrepancy between
reality (3) -and his ideological picture 
the German nation.
The recent events in Eastern Europe
have complicated the situation further
and made the German position even less
acceptable. Anyone from the Eastern
bloc who can claim German origin is
considered to be a member ofthe German
people whom it is the nation s duty to
welcome - which guarantees immediate
access to both the German national
territory and the national community. So
a Romanian or a Bulgarian whose pre-
sumed German origins go back three or
four generations can arrive in Germany
without knowing anything about it and
sometimes not even speaking any
German and immediately have more
rights than a Turk who has been living
there for 20 years or has children born
there.
This idea, part of the philosophy of
German society, of separation of  Volk
and  Reich with  Volk  taking,precedence
over  Reich means that nation, people
and territory are organised in a very
particular way, with essential categories
attendant on the right to nationality on
which the links between the individual
----
e)  Interestingly, Michel Rocard, as Prime Minis,
ter of France, echoed Valery Giscard d' Estaing and
told the House that France 'is no longer a country of
immigration
DOi
and the State are founded. So there is a
clear distinction between the German-
origin foreign populations from Eastern
Europe and the foreign Turks born in
Germany. A settlement policy is on the
cards for the former, even if it does entail I
managing the national populations dif-
ferently, but the fiction of a strict labour
policy is maintained for the latter, with no
prospect of equal rights with nationals.
In both principles and effects, this
situation is rather different from the one
obtaining in France now, where the
labour policy has involved communities
some of which, apparently, have seen
their nationality change over the past two
or three decades.
Between 1917 and 1962, Algerians
arriving in France were treated as their
status as nationals dictated. They were
important to France s proper manage-
ment of its labour problems and the
Evian agreements attempted to keep the
benefits, so Algerians were awarded a
special status as distinct from all other
foreigners - who had to comply with the
provisions of the 1945 Ordinance
whereby they were subject to a double
check once of their status as worker
(under the Ministry of Labour) and once
of their presence in the territory (under
the Ministry of the Interior). So, until
1984, any foreigner living in France had
to have two permits (valid for a year and
for three to 10 years), although of course
obtaining a residence permit depended on
having a work permit.
Not only were the first and second
work permits issued for restricted peri-
ods (4). There were regional and profes-
sional restrictions too. Only a permanent
(I Q-year) work permit valid for all profes-
sions and all areas gave the migrant
worker any real possibility of organising
his career in space and time. On top of
that, work and residence permits ran for
different periods of time (5). In their
---
) The holder was only entitled to work in a wage-
earning capacity for one year in a given profession in
a given region. Any change of region or profession or
extension of the length of his stay automatically put
him in an irregular situation,  defacto  and  de jure.  The
holder of a so-called temporary (three-year) permit
could work either in any profession in one region orin
one profession in any region.
) A worker could well have an outdated residence
permit and lose his entitlement to even a still valid
work permit. If unemployed, he could have his work
permit suspended pr withdrawn and thereby lose his
entitlement to a residence permit.
-----------------
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and social mobility of all foreign workers
in France which this system entailed were
i not so different from the South African
arrangements. Their complexity easily
explains the problems these workers have
had making plans in a situation which
, leaves so much room for administrative
: arbitrariness. The single work/residence
permit brought out in 1984, with a
. blanket two-year period of validity,
i simplified things and gave foreigners
under common law greater autonomy
I when it came to organising their lives 
, French territory. It nonetheless main-
tained the principle of dual management
by the Ministries of Labour and the
Interior.
Algerians, with their special status
were not subject to this and only came
under the Ministry of the Interior, with a
: residence permit authorising them both
to live and work in France for either one
year or 10 years. It is easy to see why
Algeria tried to free its nationals from
common law obligations (in this case the
1945 Ordinance). The paradox is that
since the Ministry of the Interior had the
worst of reputations in immigration
matters, the fact that it was the only
authority looking after them was an
advantage.
The uncertainties of nationality
The Algerian situation, which is al-
ready an exception as far as the laws
governing foreigners are concerned, is
made even more unusual by the addi-
tional effects of the nationality code - a
combination the main result of which is
to multiply the number of different
statuses in the Algerian population, and
often even in individual families, ac-
cording to date of arrival in France and
date and even place of birth.
Those born in Algeria before 1962 who
came to France before or after that date
and opted to keep their French natio-
nality are officially French citizens (this is
the case of the Harkis (6). They differ
from those who opted for Algerian
nationality in 1962 and came to work in
France as foreign nationals with Algerian
resident status. The legal situation of the
children of these two groups of people is
more complicated, despite the fact that
thcir socio-economic situation is virtually
m_-
) NDT -- Harkis, r,tir,d soldiers, ar, Algerians
who wer, recruit,d into th, Fr,nch army as auxi-
liaries during the Franco-Algerian war.
identical. There are no legal problems for
the children of Harkis or French Mos-
lems  they are French. But children of
Algerians born after 1962 are divided
according to whether they were born in
France or Algeria. Those born in Algeria
are of Algerian nationality, like their
parents, but any brothers, cousins or
friends who were born in France are Ironic return of the colonial
automatically French under Article 230f question
the nationality code whereby anyone To convey the full complexity of
born on French soil of French-born foreign immigration in France, we should parents is French. add that Tunisians and Moroccans are
Take the example of an Algerian family not in the same situation as Algerians.
living in France with two children born Unlike Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco
since 1962, one in Algeria and one in Were never French departments and their
France, and a third, born in Algeria nationals are not covered by the same
where he was looked after by his grand- provisions of the nationality code 
parents until after his 18th birthday. The the foreign population control arrange.
first child will be Algerian and, must, like ments.
his parents, have a residence permit if he The same would have been true of New
is to comply with French requirements. Caledonians if they had gained indepen-
The second is French and free to move dence. As nationals of an overseas tel'.
, about as he pleases, just like any other ritory, they, like Tunisians and Moroc-
! French citizen. The third, however, of cans, would not have had the advantages
Algerian nationality, is too old to come in attached to the status of overseas depart-
under family grouping arrangements and ment (particularly Article 23 of the
would not be authorised to settle in nationality code) - which would not be
France without first obtaining a residence the case of people from Martinique or
permit just like any other foreign worker. Guadeloupe if they found themselves in a
France s immigration arrangements 1 similar situation.
for Algerians would be unimaginable in As things stand, the marks left by
Germany. France and Germany in fact colonial history are proving to be more
have entirely different immigration man- than lasting  something amply con-
agement models (although they are the firmed by Britain, which stands out from
basis on which the realities of Europe France and Germany as much for the
tomorrow must be discussed) due to a different laws on nationality and for-
combination of two fundamentals  the eigners as for its particular history of
labour policies which dominated the immigration so highly dependent on a
whole period of economic growth and the colonial past.
rules of access to nationality in effect today. Most immigrants to Great Britain have
: been from former colonies of the Empire
Every developed country of Europe! which became members of the Com-
: has exploited its sovereignty to the full ; monwealth, being thus both nationals of
with a labour policy and laws and their countries of origin and subjects of
regulations to control entry to and Her Majesty - a status entitling them
residence on its territory. No-one in the both to go freely to the United Kingdom
1960s and 1970s ever expected the natio- and settle and work there and, most
nality access rules to be as important as important, obtain British nationality.
they are today. The provisions indeed
suggest that prospects for foreign migr. I So, when the UK brought immigration
ants to Europe (and th~irchildren) will i to the fore (in the early I 970s), it was not
J aiming to decide how to handle foreign
' differ considerably from ene c9M!Jtry o( 
immigration proper, as its immigrants the Community to another. were subjects of Her Majesty, citizens and
The combination of the foreign popu. foreigners and its immigrant control
lation control arrangements and the i policy was less a remould of the laws on
nationality code (which each country of ! the entry and residence of foreigners as a
i the Community is updating in a specific questioning of access to British natio-
i way) brings us back to the original; nality. So Britain s nationality debate
ambiguity and we shall illustrate it this ; started in 1970, although the issue only
time, for France, with cases which can be
observed in a single group or even a single
family. We want to know who is an
immigrant, who is foreign and who is
French and this brings us back to the
fundamental question of whom we mean
when we talk about immigration.
4-4Young A(~e1'ia1!s born in Europe, (A new social and legal m'del' is appearing in
Em'ope, tlms bringing progress and fi' eedom  but ande,' conditions amounting to a
reinforcement of segJ"egational mechanisms
began to be of political concern to the
French in 1985-86. One of the big things
about the British case is that it forces us to
realise that there are organic links be-
tween entry control (with illegal entry as
the central issue) and the right to natio-
nality (as related to colonial history) (1).
The weight of the colonial status, present
or past, on the status of immigrants in
France and the United Kingdom would
be unthinkable in Germany, with its
entirely different concept of nationality
and colonial past.
So the observable outlines of our
subject are not the result of chance or
particular economic circumstances, but
the lasting results of history. Nothing we
are experiencing today on the immig-
ration front is of the epiphenomenon
order. All the people now .settled in
Europe after the big waves of migrant
labour of the post war years are there
because the history of Europe has led
them there. People from the former
British colonies did not go to France and
neither did people from former French
colonies go to Britain. In the Caribbean
people left Trinidad and Jamaica for
London at almost the same time as they
left Puerto Rico for New York, Suriname
C) CV Marie Entre economie et polilique: Ie
clandestin , une figure sociale a geometrie variable in .
Pol/voirs  No 47 1988 ~-- pp 87-91.
--"""-'--"'-'----'--" "-"" .
for Amsterdam and Martinique and
Guadeloupe for Paris.
Europe and illegal entry
Now that the Single Act is about to
bear its ultimate fruit, France and indeed
all the countries of Europe are focusing I
their thinking on population movements
from the Third World on illegal entry.
The spectre (in all senses of the word) of
illegal entry is the yardstick by which all
assessments of non-western population
movements - be they involving political
refugees or a long association of labour
immigration with l,3urope  are judged.
What does the Single Act have to say 
about it?
In recommending greater freedom of
economic exchange and enlargement of
the scope of individual freedoms, the
Single Actis in line with the fine humanis-
tic spirit of the Helsinki agreements
building a Europe which gives practical
shape to the idea of freer movement of
ideas and people  with th&"single
reservation that the movement in ques-
tion is only for Europeans, as tne Schen-
gen Agreements make clear. Seen from
this point of view, Europe is in fact
displaying the twofold ambition of
having more trade, more dialogue and
more freedom (the Single Act) and more
closure, more control and more popu-
lation selection (Schengen), pushing
-- -_.........._ ~---_.._._--_.~--_._.._.._--
down the Berlin Wall with one hand and
putting a Maginot Line round its external
frontiers with the other.
A new economic, social and legal order
vaunting the merits of a labour market
where there are no barriers to movement
is being created and it invites everyone to
build its future by grasping opportunity
in whatever part of Europe it may occur.
But at the same time, it is an order which
has renewed the machinery of exclusion
by refusing to allow everyone to have this
freedom. Neither a Turk who has worked
in Germany for 20 years nor any child of
his born there will have the right to settle
in France or anywhere else in Europe 
unlike his German friends and colleagues.
We are back to European-wide selective
mobility limitation, and social mobility
~ restriction therefore, along the lines of the
~ French system, with all its residence and
~ work permits, which we mentioned ear-
5: lier and which was in fact abolished
following the young immigrants equality
march of 1983 exactly 10 years before
entry into effect of the Single Act.
Let us return to the example of the
Algerians. Children born in France of i
Algerian parents are French and will i
therefore be able to go to Germany or 
anywhere else in the EEC and settle and
take jobs there if they want to. Any
brothers or sisters born in Algeria are
Algerian and not Community citizens
and will be denied this possibility, just like
Turks born in Germany. So, after 1992
the future of a foreigner in Europe will
differ greatly according to nationality,
date of birth and country of residence in
Europe. A new social and legal order is
appearing in Europe, thus bringing prog-
ress and freedom~ but under conditions
amounting to a reinforcement of segreg-
ational mechanisms.
And what about integration? Who will
be the best integrated? Those who benefit
from the advantages offered by Com-
munity law or those who do not? And
what of those who claim equal rights
firmly and sometimes violently? Will
their vehemence be the next sign of non-
integration? Will there still be a problem
of cultural difference or discrimination in
respect of real rights? There are as many
risks of discrimination, exclusion and
marginalisation in tomorrow s Europe as
there are laws on foreign populations
and codes on nationality and non-Com-
munity nationalities in every country of
Europe. And that is not chance either. It
is our historical heritage.o c.-V. M.
..-----
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International migration is not a new
phenomenon but it has nOW emerged as a
major global issue, affecting nearly all
parts of the world. The causes and
conditions of contemporary movements
have become increasingly complex, just
as their consequences portend to be more
far-reaching than they have ever been in
the past. How the new challenges and
opportunities of world migration are
going to be handled by the sending and
receiving countries has now become a
matter of critical importance.
In the 19th and the .earlier part of the
20th century, 50 million people from
Europe  Irish and German nationals
followed by Italians, Greeks and East
Europeans migrated to North
America. The movements carried with
them the resonance of the words en-
shrined in the pedestal of the Statue of !
Liberty  Give me your tired, your poor
your huddled masses yearning to breathe
free  . There was a wide, if numerically less
important, movement of people in the
wake of the Second World W ar.B etw een 
1947 and 1951 more than one million
displaced Europeans were resettled
across countries and continents  in-
cluding 329000 in the United States;
182000 in Australia; 132000 in Israel;
123000 in Canada, and 170000 within
Europe. As the Soviets consolidated
power in the years that followed, there
was a continuing flow of refugees from
the East. More recently, in the 1960s and
early 1970s more than 10 million guest
workers and their dependents, mostly
from southern Europe and developing
countries, moved to western Europe.
These earlier migratory movements, to
cite at random only a few, were not
necessarily smooth; nor were the causes
that generated them always happy. But
barring a few exceptions, both the send-
ing and receiving countries found them
manageable, as they generally served as a
balancing force between their respective
needs. They were thought to be useful for
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economic growth and conducive to both
social dynamism and cultural diversity in
the host countries. Politically, in the
context of the Cold War, outmigration
from the East was perceived as a flight for
human freedom, and therefore worthy of
full Western support. All in all, up to the
early 1970s, the general attitude towards
international migration was positive.
A changing panorama
By the late 1970s the situation was
changing. In West Europe, economic
downturn and shrinking employment
opportunities following the first oil shock
in 1973 put a halt to the recruitment of
foreign workers. The fall in labour
demand and the disappearance of West
Europe s readiness to accept migrant
workers were, however, not as sudden as
it is sometimes imagined. In the 1950s and
the 1960s, West Europe did not witness
any significant demographic change
which in itself could create a labour
shortage, But during the period, an
extraordinary supply of external capital
and the economic expansion that fol-
lowed, created an additional demand for
labour. This could not be matched from
the available labour supply or from an
adequate rise in productivity; the recruit-
ment  of foreign labour was a logical
consequence. As the 1973 hike in the oil
price made its impact, the process came to
an end. But the restrictions on foreign
recruitment were at least partly .also the
result of a perception of high political and
social costs of immigration - a percep-
tion which had been gaining ground over
some time in several West European
countries. In practice, however, the situ-
ation evolved differently. Despite the
falling labour demand in West Europe
the ban on foreign recruitment and the
encouragement given
, ,!-
s in Gennany, for
foreign workers to returl1, not only did
the inflow of migrants--persi~t.l' but i
picked up again from the early" 1980s.
Why and how did it happen?
Since the 1960s an increasing mig-
ratory pressure was building up in many
parts of the developing world. Initially, it
was closely associated with the decolonis"
ation process. Protracted struggles for
-'--'--' ,--_._---",-~~---------_.._'-----
independence and bitter domestic strife
over the political and social system in
both old and emerging nation states,
converted comparatively stable regions
into areas of extreme social and political
volatility. In some regions, as in Africa
ethnic and tribal conflicts, added to this
instability. All this generated both inter-
nal displacements and massive migratory
movements across countries. But most of
these external refugee movements ~ with
such exceptions as the Vietnamese boat
people and the Chilean refugees - were
contained at the regional level within the
developing world. Of the two million
people who have left Vietnam, Cambodia
and Laos since the end of the Vietnam
War, more than one million have been
resettled in western countries, over
300 000 in China and the 450 000 are
scattered in the region. Some 4.5 million
Afghan refugees are still in Pakistan and
Iran. The developing world" it is worth
noting, continues to carry the vast bulk of
the world's refugee population, now
numbering 15 million.
But by the late 1970s other powerful
push factors were also at work in the
developing world. Alongside political
conflicts and a growing trend towards
suppression of democratic freedom and
flagrant abuses of human rights, there
was a continuous process of demographic
expansion, famine and economic depriv-
ation, and serious environmental degrad"
ation, including desertification, in a
number of developing countries. Not
infrequently, there was an interplay of
these factors: political upheavals thwar-
ted economic development, refugee mo-
vement led to environmental degrad-
ation, and the result was a vicious circle
forcing an increasing number of people to
flee. Although today several million of
them are migrant workers within the
developing world, economic prosperity
and political stability of western coun-
tries served as magnets for many others.
Modern means of transport and com-
munication helped accelerate their move-
ment to the West.
Defiance of regular migration
procedure
But avenues for regular immigration
were not many. In West Europe, after theA ,lUmber of illegal and legal Vietnamese migrants fu1.IJe elltered Europe and the
United States. Here we see legal migrtmts On their way to tM USA
guest workers programme had come to
an end, for those who wanted to migrate
the main, if not the only, option available
aside from family reunification ~ was
entry through the asylum procedure.
Migrants from Turkey, Yugoslavia and
the Maghreb countries, who had fol-
lowed the Italian and Spanish workers in
West Europe by the late 1960s, were soon
joined by many more from far-flung parts
of the developing world. Some of the new
entrants were admitted under the family
reunification schemes. But there were
numerous others ~ from, for example
Central America, Iran, Sri Lanka, Le-
banon, and Zaire ~ who were seeking
entry through the asylum procedure.
Many of them were victims of severe
economic deprivation, generallsed 'V'1o~
lence and repression, but they did not
meet the strict definition of refugees as
laid down in the UN Convention of 1951.
Increasingly, migratory movements by-
passed the policy of planned and orderly
migration. Immigration laws were ig-
nored or overwhelmed as identification
of migrants by established criteria
became more and more difficult due to
the complex interrelationship ofunderly-
ing causes or motivations of migration.
Faced with an increasing flow of
people seeking entry, West European
countries tightened their immigration
policies and control. But, the push factors
in the sending countries were too strong.
Increasingly, the migrants sought irre-
gular channels of entry in defiance of
immigration rules and control mecha-
nisms ~ a process in which networking
with the resident migrants in West
Europe played an important part. There
was thus a growing nurober of irregular
migrants comprising both new arrivals
and those whose tourist visas or short-
term .employment contracts had already
expired. A related development which
helped irregular migration was the econ-
omic transformation of southern Europe.
By the late 1970s Italy and Spain, for
example, had become both immigration
and emigration countries. With less
vigilant border control and increasing
opportunities for clandestine work in the
informal or less regulated sectors, they
became places of attraction for irregular
migrants. Despite its amnesty prog-
ramme of 1985- , Spain today is sup-
posed to have an irregular population of
between 300000 and 350000 (an EC .
study puts the figure much lower 
between 72 000 and 124000). Out of an
estimated 600 000 to 1 million irregular
migrants Italy may have attracted
300 000 applicants under its latest am-
nesty programme of 1990. Reliable fi-
gures are hard to come by. According to
one recent estimate which puts these
figures much higher, there are as many as
three million undocumented migrants in
the European Community alone.
In the past irregular migration in
Europe was largely linked to inter-
national flows oflaboUl:such as the guest
workers programme. But since the late
1970s it also converged with the inflow of
asylum seekers. Many of the asylum
seekers, when rejected or even before
rejection, became clandestine workers
and swelled the ranks of irregular migr-
ants. In the first half of the 1970s, only
16000 asylum seekers arrived in West
Europe each year; by the period 1985-
the average annual number increased to
200 000. In 1990 the number of asylum
seekers including those from East Europe
was hovering around 450 000 in indus-
trial Europe or more than half the total
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9 million). If industrial Europe and
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third of total annual immigration of
In North America and Australia
! (o
::,
::u", wh;ch were building up
J since the late 1970s in the developing
world for outmigration to the industrial
north  the South-North flow  also
affected North America and Australia.
But wedded to a long tradition of
immigration, and with less economic and
labour market constraints, they reacted
somewhat differently. The suppression in
all these countries - Canada in 1962, the
USA in 1965 and Australia in 1972 - of
national-origin quota systems, prompted
a steady increase in the number of
immigrants from the developing regions.
US flows from traditional sendingcoun-
tries in Europe became less important
than in the past. In the 1950s immigrants
from Europe and Canada accounted for
66 per cent of the total inflow in the USA.
In the 1980s their share had fallen to 14
per cent.
But even with this increase in the
regular flows from the developing world
: since the 1980s, North America has been
i facing the same problems of illegal
. migrants and asylum seekers as West
Europe. In the early 1980s the USA had
several million illegal migrants from
neighbouring countries, and even after
large-scale legalisation, it is now es-
timated to have 2.5 million irregular
migrants--- a higher proportion of the
national work force than in the West
European countries. The long and porous
borders and less effective control mecha-
nisms are not the only reasons for higher
incidence of irregular migration in the
USA - it also reflects a more relaxed US
attitude towards irregular migration.
However, as their numbers swelled rap-
idly in recent years, the concern about
irregular migrants has also been increas-
ing in the USA. Attention is being
focused, as was done, for example, by a
Congressional commission in 1990, on
the economic disparities between North
America and its neighbouring countries
as one of the root causes of such unau-
thorised migration.
Although numerically less important
the inflow of asylum seekers in countries
of North America has created a situation
similar to that in West Europe. In the
United States, the asylum crisis began I
shortly after the passage of the Refugee
Act of 1980. The government became
overwhelmed when 125000 Cubans
entered as asylum seekers. The Cubans
and later Haitian boat people who had
entered the USA prior to 1980 were
recognised as special entrants, and meas-
ures were taken to discourage the inflow
of new asylum seekers. But tlw flow
persisted, especially with large numbers
of Central Americans pressing for admis-
sion. But since most of them had fled
from generalised violence, civil war or
desperate economic conditions, and not
fear of personal persecution, the rate of
rejection became increasingly high.
Canada too faced new pressures of
asylum seekers; its liberal approach to
asylum was an attraction even for some of
those who had originally landed else-
where  like several thousand Salva-
dorians from the USA and the boatloads
of Sri Lankans and Sikh migrants from
India who travelled through Germany. In
response, the government revised and
tightened the asylum rules and pro-
cedures, but the pressure continues.
A landmark in East-West
migration
1989 was a special year in world
migration. During that year a total of
1.3 million people from the Warsaw Pact
countries left for the West. In the Cold
War years, regular emigration from the
Eastern bloc of Communist countries had
been seriously constrained. True, during
this period there were several waves of
migration following the suppression of
political unrest - from Hungary in 1956;
from Czechoslovakia in 1968; and from
Poland in 1956, 1968, and 1981. There
was also a large outflow from Poland in
1985 following the introduction ofliberal
passport policies and the German De-
mocratic Republic had witnessed a con-
tinuous outward movement until the
erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August
1961. Occasionally, in the context of
East-West negotiations, the Soviet Union
issued a few thousand extra exit visas for
special ethnic groups.. But never since
1951 had so many people from the East
moved to the West in -a single year as in
1989. In fact, from the early "l'970s to the
mid-1980s, the average annual outflows
of people from the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries did not exceed 100 000 people.
Among the 1.3 million people who
moved in 1989 to the West, 720000 were
East Germans and ethnic Germans from
East Europe, 320 000 were Bulgarian
Turks, (of whom nearly half returned to
Bulgaria) 80000 were asylum-seekers
mainly Poles, and 137000 were Soviet
Jews (who left for the USA, Israel and
Greece). Dramati'i changes in East and
Central Europe, marked by a process of
political liberalisation and easing of
emigration, alongside new trends in East-
West relations, unleashed these move-
ments. Movements of people themselves
contributed to the liberalisation process,
as symbolised by the fall of the Berlin
Wall on 9 November 1961 when 30000
people crossed the border within hours of
its opening.
Soon this westward exodus generated
movements also across the eastern
region. Hungary witnessed an inflow of
30 000 ethnic Hungarians from Romania
as refugees; 40 000 Poles moved to East
Germany (the GDR) to take up jobs left
open by the German exodus. Tens of
thousands of Serbs in Romania (and
Kosovo) arrived in Serbia in Yugoslavia.
And, internal displacements  such as
the uprooting of 400 000 people follow-
ing conflicts in Armenia and Azerbaijan
- were emerging as a potential source .
pressure for external migration.
These migratory trends, although
somewhat tempered by German reunifi-
cation, persisted in 1990-1991 and look
set to continue in the coming years. As
things stand now, rising ethnic and
political tensions in several countries
soaring unemployment and mounting
social hardships linked to the transitional
phase of economic reconstruction, con-
tinuing environmental degradation and
the political and economic uncertainty
that tends to threaten the Soviet Union
are causing concern ~ both in West and
East Europe.
Causes and conditions of
migration
What then are the roots of migration?
The general causes of international mig-
ration as revealed by the major outflows
in the past are well known. But the
complex manner in which different
causes and contributing factors act and
interact with each other in the context of
specific migration flows defies general-
ised simplification.
Contrasting economic, demographic
and labour market conditions between
countries generally encourage migration.
These contrasts are easy to discern.
Global population is expected to increase:;;
A Gypsy mothe!" am! chUd on  (1  street  in  Brussels, For these people, migratiml
constitutes a way of life. How are riley going to cope with the new legislation of
1993 ?
from 5.2 billion at present to 8.4 billion in
2025.  The population in industrial coun-
tries will grow by 147 million dming this
period to 1.35 billion. By contrast the
increase  in the developing region, will be
of the order of 3.0 billion, and will far
exceed the industrial nations total  popu-
lation. The developing country share in
global population could jump from 68
percent to 84 percent in 2025. Population
in the industrial countries is ageing, but
the developing world is expecting an
increase in younger population. The
present age structure in most developing
countries means higher birth rates, even if
fertility rates fall, and a spectacular
increase in the labour force in the coming
decades. The imbalances will be drama-
tic. In 1990 the industrial world had a
labour force; of 586 million. The de-
veloping country labour for , I. bilIion
in 1990, will increase by 360 million by
2000  and by 733 million by 2010. Thus
20 years the  increase  in the number of job-
seekers in developing countries should be
well above the industrial world' total
active population today.
The economic gaps  too  are staggering.
The annual income per head of more than







$17 000 in the high income countries
stands in striking contrast with $750 in
the developing countries. The gap is
much wider  for  sub-Saharan Africa or
South Asia where respective incomes per
head do not exceed $350 and $320. Just as
economic growth within the developing
region remains unevenly distributed, the
income distribution in many developing
countries continues to be highly skewed.
Such economic disparities are often
reinforced by differences between indus-
trial and developing countries in the
social services and amenities available 
the general public. These economic and
social inequalities, alongside a heightened
awareness of them, resulting from spread
of education and wider use of mass
media, notably television, even in some of
the remotest parts of the developing
world, are clearly among the main sour-
ces of pressure for the South-North
movement.
The push and pull effects of these
imbalances are often modified  they
could be reinforced or weakened - by
other factors, including migration po-
licies and practices of sending and receiv-
ing countries. Labour market and econ-
omic imbalances, for example, accelerate
inter-country movements of people, as
was the case with West Europe s guest
workers programme in 1960- , when
they are sustained by active immigration
policies and other inducements of the
receiving country. Conversely, regardless
of the willingness and absorptive capacity
of the country of destination, people may
leave their homelands under the compul-
sion of exceptional circumstances. These
could include armed conflict, civil strife
political and social repression; ethnic and
communal hostilities and violence;
famine, pestilence and extreme poverty;
natural disasters, persistent environ-
mental degradation and erosion of the
life-sustaining eco-system.
Historical and cultural links, prior
migration experience, social networking
and other structural factors often play
their part in influencing migratory move-
ments. Prior movements of people and
links established over time, for example
can create their own dynamic and foster
further migration. External cultural pen-
etration and acquired patterns of con-
sumption and aspirations, helped by the
demonstration effect of previous migr-
ants, can induce people  to  look for
opportunities outside the home country.
In such a situation, economic disparity
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consideration; and the poorest may not
be among the first to move out. An
improved economic situation in the home
country may not restrain migration, but
could even help it by enhancing the
financial capacity ofpeople to migrate, as
may have been the Case in Mexico which
witnessed continued migration despite
strong economic growth in the I 960s and
most of the 1970s.
On the other hand, restored confidence
in the home country economy and optim~
ism about future prospects at home may
restrain emigration and could even en-
courage return migration, although econ-
omic disparities, within certain limits
may continue to exist between the coun-
tries concerned. The retUrn of 650 000
Greeks from all over the globe especially
North and West Europe during 1971-
the slowing down of Italian emigration
from 1967 and similar trends in Spain and
Portugal from the mid-1980s are cases in
point.
Discerning the future challenge
in Europe
East European and Mediterranean
flows.
How these and various substratum
causes and conditions of migration act
and interact with one another, and with
what effect, can only be assessed in the
context of specific migratory flows. As
West Europe stands today face to face
with two major migratory movements 
one from East Europe and the other from
the southern and eastern rim of the
Mediterranean, it is interesting to analyse
how even the same sets of factors 
demographic, economic, political and
ethnic  are going to influence their
future trends differently.
-- Demographic profiles.
The demographic profiles of East and
West Europe  annual increase in
population, age structure and fertility
rate  are largely symmetrical, and the
minor demographic differences that exist
at present will not by themselves be a
major source of migratory pressure in the
coming years. True, there will be a slight
bulge in the population structure result-
ing from an increase in the number of
young people, aged 15- , in countries
like Poland and the Soviet Union but it
will not be markedly visible before the
turn of the century. Demographic imbal-
ances between the southern and eastern
Mediterranean region and industrial
Europe, on the other hand, hold the
potential of enormous pressure for out-
- --------..-------- ------,--- -----------------------
Matel"ial poverty alongside with cultural
and intellectual rlcltlless- the latter 
o.f1m the sole wealth of immigrants,
Above: an African cultm'al event ill
Paris
I ward migration. Population in the Medit-
erranean region increased three times
faster than in industrial Europe during
1960-70; the increase will be 17 times
faster in the 1990s. Countries like Aus-
tria, Sweden and Germany will probably
show no increase, or even a slight fall, in
their population by the year 2000. During
the same period the population in Libya
will increase by 43 per cent; in Syria by 40
per cent; in Sudan by 3:1fJer cent and in
Algeria by 31 per cent.
On the southern shore of the Mediter-
ranean, the average woman has five
children; in industrial Europe, she has
between one and two. This high fertility
ratc, coupled with the young age struc-
ture of the population, is leading to a
massive increasc in the Mediterranean
--- -------..---- - ----------------------
region s labour force. Industrial Europe
labour force increased by six million
during 1960-70; it will grow only by
7 million in the 1990s. By contrast, the
southern and eastern Mediterranean
region s labour force, which increased by
7.4 million during 1960- , will grow by
22.4 million in the 1990s. This imbalance
- which is far more pronounced than the
gap between the industrial and develop-
ing countries in general  will certainly
add to the migratory pressure, especially
from the countries on the southern shore
of the Mediterranean.
Economic disparities
What about the economic factors?
They will certainly continue to encourage
movements of people both from East
Europe and the Mediterranean region
towards industrial Europe, although the
manner in which they will influence the
two flows will not be the same. Compared
to industrial Europe, both East Europe
and the Mediterranean region are poor
but the latter is even poorer. In 1988
according to OECD Figures, the average
person s income in East Europe was
rougWy one-third of that in industrial
Europe. In the Mediterranean region it
was about one-eighth. In absolute terms
the income difference doubled between
. 1960- 1985. There are no indications that
the income disparity will narrow in the
near future.
Thus, judging by the extent of econ-
omic disparities, the economic affluence
of industrial Europe could be a stronger
magnet for the people in the Mediter-
ranean region than those in East Europe.
But the push effects of the current
economic realities, on the other hand
would be more powerful in East Europe
than in the Mediterranean region. The
main reason for this is the sudden and
painful thrust of the region s economic
reforms as part of its transition to the
market system. As the countries launched
these tough measures, and made their
strides towards market economies, their
real output shrank by more than 8 per
cent in 1990; the decline, will persist
though more modestly, at least for the
coming two years. Consumer prices
which rose by 34% in 1990, will jump by a
further 45% this year. Meanwhile, job-
lessness has been increasing throughout
East Europe. It could exceed 4 million in
East European countries and 5.3 million
in the Soviet Union this year, and might
reach, according to one estimate, 14 mil-
lion or 21 per cent of the working
population in Eastern Europe and 30-
40 million in the Soviet Union by 1994.An important point to note is that these
changes are happening to people who
have lived under command economies
and state paternalism for more than 40
years. Their sudden exposure to un-
employment, inflation and a rupture of
social security arrangements are adding
to their restlessness and sharpening their
urge to look for opportunities elsewhere.
These push factors are reinforced by the
explosion of exaggerated expectations
about the West. Significantly, the Soviet
authorities are pondering a projected
departure of between 4 and 6 million
people in the coming years, possibly after
the new emigration law comes into force
in 1993. Clearly, as foreshadowed by the
age structure, occupational profiles and
geographical origins of some of the recent
migrant groups, a large part of the eastern
migration will continue to be motivated
by economic considerations. All this
seems to suggest that the current and
impending economic difficulties will
make East Europe more volatile than the
southern Mediterranean region.
The situation in East Europe could
however .change significantly after the
mid- or late 1990s. Calculations diverge
but there are indications that by that
time, most Central-East European coun-
tries (the Soviet Union is a special case)
will be over much of the difficulties of the
transition, and that their economies
could well be on the road to recovery and
positive growth. At that point, economic
migration could stabilise. In the southern
Mediterranean region, by contrast, the
migratory pressure resulting from econ-
omic factors encouraging migration are
likely to be more stubborn and could
persist over a much longer period, unless
of course, new and more innovative
measures are initiated,
Nationalist and ethnic ferment
Turning to the political and ethnic
factors, several countries in the southern
Mediterranean region, notably Lebanon
and Sudan, have long been disturbed by
political upheavals which have caused
both internal displacements and external
migration flows. In many parts of the
region, political and religious tensions
and suppression of democratic rights still
continue and these remain a potential
source of political instability and mig-
ratory pressure. But, for the time being
and barring new developments which
cannot be predicted, it looks as though
these may not explode into mass exodus.
The situation in several east Mediter-
ranean countries, on the other hand, is
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very similar to that in much of East
Europe, including the Soviet Union.
Almost all these countries hold the
potential of increasingly serious national-
ist and ethnic conflicts, and if they erupt
into large-scale violence, mass exodus
may be unavoidable. Several of these
countries also have large ethnic groups
who are likely to make use of the newly
found freedom of movement to migrate
even without violent conflicts and inter-
nal dislocations.
Three large minority populations in the
whole region  ethnic Germans (3 mil-
lion in Poland, Romania and the Soviet
Union), Jews (1.5 million mainly in the
Soviet Union), and the Armenians
(3.5 million in the territory of Armenia
Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Soviet
Union)  are West-oriented, have been
traditionally mobile and have strong
political and ethnic links in western
countries. The continuing outmigration
of these people  ethnic Germans to
Germany, Jews to Israel and the USA
and the Armenians to France and the
USA  will gather further momentum if
there is a deterioration in the region
political, economic or environmental
situation. But these are not the only
minorities who may be ready to move
out. Several other minority groups 
notably, the 2. 4 million Gypsy popu-
lation scattered all over the region
2 million Hungarians in Romania
600 000-700 000 Turks in Bulgaria and
250000-400000  Greeks in Albania 
feel vulnerable to ethnic conflicts and
xenophobic tensions. They may be in-
duced or compelled to seek opportunities
elsewhere within the region or in West
Europe.
But the problem of ethnic minorities 
which is endemic, complex and wides-
pread goes far beyond this. Nearly, all the
states in East Europe, including the
Soviet Union, even the relatively homo-
geneous Poland and Hungary, are ethni-
cally diversified societies. So are Albania
and Yugoslavia. Taken together, the
ethnic minorities account for a large
proportion of the national p.opulation in
these states - 64 per cent in Yugo~1avia;
48 percent in the Soviet Union; 36 per
cent in Czechoslovakia and so on:-\;'f-lie
tensions among these ethnic groups -
often reinforced by religious and linguis-
tic differences and worsened by conflicts
and suspicion rooted in history  are
being fuelled by nationalist sentiments
and - secessionist tendencies. Likewise,
separatist forces are seeking support from
-. --------- ---------------- 
- -- ---------------___.__m____
__-
ethnic groups. From all indications
ethnic factors are set to play an increas-
ingly important part in national and local
politics.
But since ethnic groupings often cut
across the territorial boundaries of in-
dividual republics or provinces, they can
also complicate and counteract the
nationalist tendencies, by demanding
autonomy within the republic or es-
. tablishing links outside. Sixty-five million
Soviet citizens - 25 million Russians and
40 million non-Russians  live outside
their ethnic territories. All the six Union
Republics which now claim complete
independence face battles with their
minorities  most of which demand
autonomy or seek to remain part of the
Soviet Union or of Russia. Yugoslavia
faces a similar situation: its Bosnia-
Herzegovina Republic is made up 
Croats, Serbs and Moslems. Serbia
minority groups include Albanians, Hun-
garians and Croats, Croatia has 600 000
Serbs as one of its minority groups and
the pattern is the same in the rest of the
country. If this makes the ethnic and
nationality tensions highly explosive, it
must not be forgotten that many nrino-
rities have close ethnic links across
neighbouring countries  Macedonian
Greeks and Turks in Bulgaria; Greeks in
Albania; Albanians in Yugoslavia
(Kosovo); Rumanians in Moldovia 
are some of the examples. In such a
setting ethnic conflicts and potential
irrenditism could, if rekindled by aspir-
ations long embedded in history, lead to
violent challenges to existing frontiers
and unleash instability and disorderly
movements of people.
True, the Soviet people, with the
exception of the Armenians, Jews and
ethnic Germans, do not have a long
tradition of migration. It is also true that
to a large extent, ethnic and nationalist
tensions in the countries of East Mediter-
ranean and East Europe have so far been
contained within the regions. But it
would be unwise to assume that this will
continue to be so. History shows how
quickly exodus psychosis can take hold.
If the ethnic and political pressures reach
a breaking point and erupt into violence
aggravating economic dislocations and
environmental degradation, there could
be waves of migration flowing over the
rest of Europe, both East and West.o
B.G.
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This article describes the pattern of the women came to work in their own (Somalis, Cypriots, Afro-Caribbeans) in
immigration  to  the United Kingdom right. Adult immigration has been very ports like London, Liverpool and Car-
the ways in which members of the low since the early 1970s. diff.
ethnic minority communitie~ have  - refugees and asylum seekers. These
settJed her.e and the steps which the Indians 
include Greek and Turkish Cypriots
Ulllted KlngdoI?- government as a 1965-74 was the peak period ofimmig- Vietnamese Iranians Sri Lankans and
whole  mvolvmg all the relevant ration when one-third (132000) of In- th '  artment and a enci has
many  ers. 
ians arrived; a quarter (85  000)  had
taken to assist the process of their arrived in the previous decade and a o. a shlftlllg population of stu~ents, bu- integration. further quarter (85000) arrived in the 
smessmen and wealthy expatriates from
many different countries. following decade. These data relate to
persons born in India and include those
who entered the UK via East Africa (see
below). As with immigration from the
rest of the Indian sub-continent, arrivals
in recent years have been mainly spouses
and fiance(e)s. The number of children
has declined substantially reflecting the
fact that most of the spouses have been
newly married and thus have not brought
children with them on arrival.
East Mrican Asians
Immigration to the 
Since the Second World War millions
of people have migrated to Western
Europe from countries in Asia, Africa
and the Caribbean, mainly to meet labour
market shortages. It has been estimated
that there are now about 60 million
people of ethnic minority origin in
Western Europe, including Britain.
Large scale migration to Britain started
as a result of labour shortages after the
Second World War; though some earlier
settlers had come from the West Indies
during the war to volunteer for service in
the armed forces. From the mid 1950s
there was substantial migration par-
ticularly by those who were British
subjects from the new Commonwealth;
first from the mid 1950s to the early 1960s
from the West Indies and Guyana; later
from the Indian sub-continent and sub-
sequently Asians from East Africa. Head
of household immigration has now virtu-
ally ceased, except for those seeking
asylum whose numbers have grown
rapidly in recent years - and for people
with special skills who are eligible for
work permits. These communities have
become well established, with population
growth arising mainly from births to
those already settled, though there are
still some new arrivals as a result of
marriage and, for Bangladeshis in par-
ticular, a process of family reunion.
The peak periods of arrival for the
different ethnic minority groups were as
follows:
West Indians
About two-thirds (150000) of West
Indians arrived in the period 1955-64 and
About two-thirds (150000) of West
Indians arrived in the period 1955-64 and
quarter (55000) in the following
decade. Although the arrival of women
retlected family reunion, in many cases
---
) Minister of State at the Home Office-
Nearly all East African Asians are of
Indian ethnic origin. Three quarters
(142000) of those born in East Africa
arrived in this country in the late 1960s
and during the 1970s. This period covered
the forced exodus of United Kingdom
Passport Holders from Uganda and the
process of ' Africanisation' in Kenya
Tanzania and Malawi.
Pakistanis
Over a third (70  000)  of Pakistanis
arrived in the period 1965-74 and over a
third (75000) in 1975-84. Thus immig-
ration from Pakistan tended to lag behind
that from India. (Pakistan ceased to be a
member of the Commonwealth in 1971
but rejoined in 1989.
Bangladeshis
Similarly, immigration from Ban-
gladesh tended to lag behind that from
Pakistan with over a third (28  000)
arriving in the fifteen year period 1965-
followed by nearly a third (24  000)  in the
five-year period f980-g4.' Reflecting the
later immigration from Bangladesh, most
of the children who have a-rrivecFfrom the
Indian sub-continent in recent years have
been from Bangladesh.
Besides these communities, there are
also:
'" longstanding ethnic minority  com-
munities of trading and seafaring origin
Some 2.6 million people in the United
Kingdom are of ethnic minority origin 
7% of the total population. Just under a
half of the total ethnic minority popu-
lation were born in the United Kingdom
and nearly 75% are British citizens.
Population distribution
Nearly 70% of members of the ethnic
minority communities live in the metro-
politan areas, .as compared with just over
30% of the white population. They make
up 14% of the population in Greater
London, 13% in the West Midlands and
7% in West Yorkshire; but only 2%
outside the metropolitan counties. Well
over half of West Indians live in Greater
London, and over half of Bangladeshis:
Pakistanis, in contrast, are spread much
more widely, with their largest concen-
tration in the West Midlands and West
Yorkshire.
While most Asians are more likely than
white people to live in owner occupied
housing, and Afro-Caribbeans in rented
often council owned flats, the great
majority of both groups live in poorer
quality accommodation than the rest of
the population in comparable forms of
housing or tenure.
Age. The ethnic minority population is
younger overall than the white popu-
lation. The age profile of different mi-
nority groups differs, with more recently
arrived groups like the Bangladeshis
having some 47% aged under 15.
Employment. Around a quarter of
Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men
are self-employed, against 15% of the
white population. West Indians are found
mainly as employees. Though Indians are
slightly more likely than whites to have
non-manual jobs and young Asians
, generally are increasingly entering white
--_.---------- ---- ---.- --. .----. --- . - - - ---------...--------------- ----.-.-.------!';
The  UK  government s fundamental objective is that Britain should be a fail' and just
society where everyone, if"respective of ethnic origin, is able to pa'"ticipate Ji"eely am!
fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation 
(...
collar occupations, West Indians, Pakis-
tanis and Bangladeshis are very much less
likely to  do  so,
Unemployment. Through most of the
1980s the average unemployment rate of
members of ethnic minorities was twice
that of white people, regardless of age or
the level of qualifications; by 1988 the up
turn in the economy was beginning to
reduce this difference. However, there are
marked variations between different
communities. Averages of 1987-89 survey
results show that at 10% the Indian
unemployment rate for men is closer to
that for the white male population (9%),
while that for Pakistanis and Banglades-
his is as high as 25%. The Afro-Carib-
bean men s unemployment rate, at 18%
is twice that of white men.
Unemployment is worse among the
young. 21 % of ethnic minority young
people aged 16-24 who are available for
work are unemployed, as against 12% of
white young people. Again, however
there are differences between different
groups.
Racial discrimination. Research (par-
ticularly Black and White Britain: the
third PSI study, Heinemann 1984) and
studies and investigations carried out by
the Commission for Racial Equality and
others have shown that racial discrimi-
nation remains a major reason for the
differences between white and ethnic
minority experiences in employment
housing and other services.. and that it
affects people of all the minority races,
the well qualified as well as those without
qualifications. The economic prospects
of many members of the ethnic minority
communities have also been dispropor-
tionately affected by the economic prob-
lems of the inner cities where many live
by the shrinkage in demand for unskilled
labour, and by structural changes in  some
industries in which some communities
have traditionally found work.
Nevertheless, while discrimination and
disadvantage remain major problems
there are some encouraging signs. Be-
cause  most  of the larger ethnic minority
communities in the United Kingdom
originate from the Commonwealth they
have always, whether or not they become
British citizens, been entitled  to  vote and
take part in public life. Men and women
from many different communities are
making their mark, not only through
success in their careers, but through
voluntary and public service. Both the
House of  Commons  and the House of
Lords now have members from t1ieethnic
minorities. The number of ethnic mi-
nority councillors in local government is
continuing  to  grow (and many have
moved into senior positions), as is rep-
resentation on the boards of public
bodies, and in other public appointments.
Nearly 2% of magistrates, I % of solici"
tors and' some 6% of barristers, are now
from the ethnic minorities, and progress
to the judiciary has started. Recruitment
to the police from the ethnic minority
communities is rising. The processes of
change within our society, as within the




The UK Government's fundamental
objective is that Britain should be a fair
and just society where everyone, irrespec-
tive of ethnic origin, is able to participate
freely and fully in the economic, social
and public life' of the nation while having
the freedom to maintain their own
religious and cultural identity. Members
of ethnic minorities, a growing propor-
tion of whom were born in the United
Kingdom, are an integral part of British
society.
The government sets the framework
for such a policy by ensuring that its
general policies and programmes, includ-
ing the special initiatives it is taking in the
inner cities, benefit all sections of society.
The government also supports legis-
lation institutions and programmes
which are targeted directly at tackling
racial discrimination and promoting
equality of opportunity and at racialist
actions threatening public order.
The main instrument against racial
discrimination is the Race Relations Act
1976. This makes racial discrimination
unlawful in employment, training and
related matters, in education, in the
provision of goods, facilities and services
and in the disposal and management of
premises. The Act gives individuals a
right of direct access  to  the civil courts
and industrial tribunals for legal remedies
for unlawful discrimination. It does  not
however, make provision for positive
discrimination, which is expressly out-
lawed.
The Race Relations Act also establi-
shed the Commission for Racial Equality
to  help enforce the legislation and to
promote equality of opportunity and
good relations between people of dif-
ferent racial groups generally. The  Com-
mission has a general responsibility for
advising the government on the working
of the Act and it is also a principal source
of information and advice for the general
public about the Act. The Commission
has discretion to assist individuals who
consider they have been discriminated
against.
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dependent body, is funded by the Home
Office and will receive some f14 million
grant-in-aid in 1991-92: of this nearly
f4 million supports a network of local
Racial Equality Councils throughout the
country, with which the Commission
works in close partnership.
In addition, the Public Order Act 1986
which makes unlawful, incitement to
racial hatred, came into force on I April
1987.
However, the UK government believes
that good community relations cannot be
established solely by legislation or by
administrative measures. They must
evolve from mutual understanding and
respect among people pf all races, which
in turn requires a freedom from fear of
racial violence, hatred or harassment and
the removal of other barriers to equality
of opportunity.
There must be a commitment 
achieving these goals on the part of all
concerned: central and local govern-
ment; other public agencies; the private
sector both as employers and as providers
of services and facilities; the voluntary
sector; the media; and, of course, the
ethnic minority communities themselves.
The UK government welcomes the
contribution to national life already
being made by many members of ethnic
minorities, and positively encourages
members of ethnic minorities to become
active citizens, participating in and con-
tributing to mainstream economic and
social development. It supports program-
mes designed to develop confidence
competence and self help among mem-
bers of the ethnic minorities, to ensure
fair access to services and training for
employment and to encourage enterprise.
ethnic minority communities into ac-
count and make fair and appropriate
provision, as for any other citizen.
Nevertheless, the government recognises
that additional assistance may be neces-
sary in some areas of provision.
The main thrust of government fund-
ing in respect of such provision is de-
livered by Section  11  of the Local
Government Act 1966 which allows for
the payment of grant to local authorities
who are required to make special provi-
sion in the delivery of their services for
people from the New Commonwealth
whose language or culture differs from
that ofthe rest of the community and who
are disadvantaged as a result. The
government believes that Section 11 has
an important role to play in assisting
ethnic minority communities to enter
fully, and benefit from, the mainstream of
national life.
At present over noD m is paid 
support of some 12000 additional local
authority posts. About 80% is spent in
education, mainly in the teaching of
English, with the rest spent in additional
provision in social services, housing,
business and employment.
In October 1990 the government an-
nounced new arrangements for the
administration of the grant to take effect
from April 1992. These new arrange-
ments concentrate upon more effective
delivery of grant. These require those
bidding for money to set recognisable
targets and objectives and to monitor the
work of their proposed projects. The
emphasis for the grant will be on practical
projects designed to meet identified needs
such as lack of English or low achieve-
metlt in schools. Projects are judged
against particular criteria set out in
detailed policy statements sent to local
authorities, and all projects will regularly
need to take account of the views of those
who benefit from the project. The new
arrangements seek also to ensure in-
creased involvement of the voluntary
sector in local auJhori~~ projects.
Government action
The government believes that ethnic
minority needs should, wherever
possible, be met from main public sector
programmes, since the basic needs of
members of ethnic minorities for edu-
cation, employment, training, housing,
health or social services are common to Legislative change is recognised as
the whole community. Members of the desirable in due course, l)ut tl-nnscope of
ethnic minority communities contribute any legislative change would need to be
through tax and other charges to the carefully considered. It would, however
funding of main public sector program" be likely to remove the restriction of the
mes, and are fully entitled to expect that payment of grant to New Common-
in planning and delivering services forthe wealth citizens only, and to enable the
community as a whole, central and local payment of grant through other bodies
vernment Will tke the presence
~~_ =~~_
~~~:~a authOlities.
In the meantime the government has
introduced a new Ethnic Minority Grant
effective from April 1992, which will be
paid through Training and Enterprise
Councils to fund employment, training
and enterprise projects based in the
voluntary sector. The new grant is
payable for projects designed to meet the
needs of all ethnic minority communities
and is not restricted to those of Com-
monwealth origin.
The UK government's aim is to help
the members of such communities to
benefit fully from opportunities for
educational, economic and . social de-
velopment. To this end the grant has
provided, and will continue to provide,
support in the teaching of English, in
strategies aimed at improving edu-
cational performance and in tackling
particular needs which arise where econ-
omic social or cultural differences
impede aCcess to opportunities or ser-
vices.
Training and Enterprise Councils
The newly-formed Training and Enter-
prise Councils are the key to achieving the
broad objectives that the government has
for training and enterprise in England
and Wales. (In Scotland, Local Enter-
prise Companies perform a similar func-
tion.) TECs are employer-led bodies with
a board of directors drawn mostly from
local private sector employers. The pro-
grammes run by TECs aim to equip
people with the skills in demand by
employers. In planning the training and
enterprise provision it intends to offer
each TEC must carry out an assessment
of the training needs of its local labour
market. This must take into account the
needs of all sections of the community,
including those from ethnic minority
groups. The Race Relations Act allows
TECs to run training provision restricted
to a particular racial group where this
group is under-represented in the local or
national labour market.
Home Office Ethnic Minority
Business Initiative
The Home Office also provides fund"
ing- l m this year- for direct grants
to support projects aimed at reducing
racial disadvantage. Grants are provided
primarily to ethnic minority-led and
other voluntary organisations working
mainly in the inner cities, often in
partnership with other government de-Fashion knows no boundaries. This Black Beauty shop ill Bmssels could equally be
in Shepkel'd's Bush (London), BarMs (Paris)  or  Amsterdam
partments, local authorities, the private
sector and/or charitable trusts.
Many of the projects fall within the
ambit of the Home Office s Ethnic
Minority Business Initiative (EMBI)
which was set up in 1985. It is recognised
that some ethnic communities face par-
ticular disadvantages in setting up in
business, and EMBI seeks to improve the
access of ethnic minority businesses to
business development services, and help
them participate fully in the mainstream
of business life. Support is given  to  five
ethnic minority-led Local Enterprise
Agencies (which provide advice, support
and training for small businesses), in
multi-racial areas of London, Birming-
ham and Bristol, and for some outreach
workers in other mainstream enterprise
agencies, whose purpose is  to  encourage
prospective and existing ethnic minority
businesses to make use of the agency's
services.
The Initiative has, with the help of a
Planning Group including representat-
ives from the ethnic minority business
world and other Government Depart-
ments, hosted two Conferences - in May
1989 and February 1990. These brought
together ethnic minority business men
and women, key people from the finan-
cial services sector and Government and
private sectored initiatives for business
. development  to  focus on the potential
and needs of new and developing ethnic
minority businesses. A third conference is
due to be held in November 1991,
small independent Development
Team was set up in August 1989, follow-
ing the first conference. The team is
working  to  heighten awareness of the
particular needs of ethnic minority small
businesses, and, in partnership with other
agencies, to help increase the contacts
and flow of business between black and
Asian entrepreneLrs and the wider busi-
ness community. It has, for example
helped set up a local purchasing scheme
and has run a series of workshops for
bank managers. The Team is currently
working with Training and Enterprise
Councils  to  seek to ensure that their
individual enterprise strategies recognise
the needs of ethnic minority entrep-
reneurs. The Team s work is likely 
continue until early 1992.
Inner city initiatives
The government pursues a range of
initiatives aimed at the problems of the
inner cities, where a high proportion of
the United Kingdom s ethnic minority
population live. The priorities for action
are to encourage enterprise and help new
and existing businesses; to improve job
prospects; to improve "Condi4-9JIS by
tackling dereliction, developing sites and
improving housing; and to make-tJ),ner
city areas safe and attractive places  to  live
and work.
The Urban Programme, for example
was the first major public spending
programme targeted solely on the inner
cities. Grant is provided for urban re-
generation projects targeted at priority
groups and areas in 57 local authorities.
Although  not  primarily designed  to  help
race relations, the Urban Programme
recognises the special needs of ethnic
minority communities and over no mil-
lion was spent on projects specifically
benefiting ethnic minority groups in
1989-90. Other government programmes
such as the Department of Trade and
Industry s Inner City Task Forces are
specifically designed  to  maximise involve-
ment of local people and public and
private sector bodies. Task Forces and
the Department of the Environment's
City Action Teams seek  to  increase
enterprise, employment and training
opportunities for all the local population
particularly those from ethnic minority
groups.
The  Home  Office s Safer Cities Pro-
gramme is designed  to  tackle crime and
fear of crime in 20 selected inner city
areas and includes a number of local
schemes aimed, for example, at tackling
racial harassment.
The pilot of an exciting new inner city
initiative called City Challenge was
launched by Michael Heseltine, the Sec-
retary of State for Environment, in
May 1991. Fifteen Urban Programme
authorities were invited  to  take the lead in
preparing plans for the regeneration of
deprived areas which are critical  to  the
quality of life of their cities, drawing on
the talent and expertise of local people
the private sector, academic commu-
nities, statutory agencies and the volun-
tary sector. The best 10 programmes
(selected at the end of July) will have the
opportunity of a share in f75 million in
1992- , top sliced from the Department
of the Environment' s inner city resources.
Some of these programmes include multi-
racial areas. Continued funding will
normally be available for up  to  five years.
Depending on the success of this pilot
and the local authorities concerned have
responded very positively  to  the initia-
tive, it is intended  to  introduce a wider
City Challenge Scheme next year.
The aims of fair and equal treatment
for all, and of eliminating unlawful
discrimination are only gradually being
achieved, but their benefits, in avoiding
waste of talent and efforts, and maintain-
ing social harmony, are now widely
recognised. There is a long way  to go
before members of our ethnic minority
communities achieve their full potential
in the economic, social and cultural life of
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ration issue  in  the  ommunity
An ACP  view
Migration patterns both within and
outside of Europe have often been a
response to differences in socio-economic
and political situations between countries
and regions. In earlier years, we have seen
legions of European migrants respond to
the positive attraction and opportunities
offered by North America and Australia.
Since the 1960s, Central Europe has
similarly exercised a ' pull' effect on
migrants from Southern Europe, notably
Yugoslavia and Turkey. Indeed, host
countries have formulated quite liberal
policies designed to govern the stay 
I such migrants as temporary or short -term
workers.
More recently, the developments in
Eastern Europe seem likely to herald
added dimensions to the immigration
phenomenon as new migrants respond to
their new found freedom of movement by
moving into Western Europe in search of
a better standard of living and personal
fulfilment. Coinciding with the mig-
rations westward within Europe, have
been movements to Europe from coun-
tries of the developing world by people
who are reacting to adverse economic
situations. These have been brought
about by several factors: the impact upon
their societies of international economic
conditions and environmental degrad-
ation as well as internal conflicts with
their attendant threats to, and violation
of individual human rights. Population
explosion in some developing countries
as well as labour shortages in some
sectors ofthe Community have also been
contributory factors. ('
~he cumulative effect of such mig-
ratIOn has been immense with the struc-
tures and policies of the recipient coun-
tries being placed under tremendous
strain to handle what has become almost
a spontaneous resettlement. Thus, many
countries have sought to respond by ~
:;;
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implementing stricter immigration po-
licies and systems of control. Accord-
ingly, as legal entry becomes more dif-
ficult to obtain, the number of illegal
migrants has grown with many migrants
resorting to the use of available asylum
procedures to gain entry.
In the interim, the increasing immig-
ration pressure from developing coun-
tries is being considered .an important
factor leading to an increase in social and
racial tension, in some recipient coun-
tries, to such an extent that immigration
has become an explosive issue in national
politics. A Report prepared for the
European Commission has characterised
the immigration issue as a ' hot potato' in
some Member States, expressing a fear
that it was becoming a subject of a
political logic' rather than a 'technical
logic' needed to help identify and solve
important problems. (1)
(2) 'Policies on Immigration and the Sociallt1!eo-
ration of Migrants in the European Communitf.
Brussels, September 1990 (SEC(90) 1813 FINAL)
The ACP migrant
Figures on ACP migrants within the
Community are not readily available.
The figures provided by the Commission
Report suggest that non-European re.
sidents within the Community totaHed
9 million in 1988, of which 2227552
were from Africa, mainly North Africa.
The figures for the rest of Africa, South of
the Sahara including South Africa, was
422606 - about 5% of the resident non-
European population. As the vast
majority of the population of the ACP
States comes from Africa, and it has been
Africa which has been most subject, in the
ACP, to recent waves of migration, it can
be argued that it would be that continent
which would provide the greatest propor-
tion of ACP migrants to Europe. Thus
the proportion of all ACP migrants could
reasonably be expected to be only slightly
higher than that in the Commission
Report.
The definition of a migrant, within the
ACP terminology, covers three broad
categories: legal (and illegal) immigrants;
migrant workers and students. The latter
ACP immigrants in town, doing as e\"(~ry parent!
The figm'es fol" A.fi"icl1, south of Saham iucfl/dhlK South Africa, were about  5% 
the resident iiOIl-Eul'Opean population in 1988 
,---.---. -...two categories represent groups which
reside legally within the Community,
albeit for pre-determined periods, but
they are the groups which come most
readily to mind when one thinks of ACP
migrants. They are also groups which
often seek to transform themselves into
legal (or illegal) migrants by attempting
to stay on in the host countries upon
completion of their agreed stay.
ACP concerns
The ACP Group of States has, on
many occasions, expressed concern at the
situation of ACP students and migrant
workers residing legally within the Com-
munity. The Group has, during sessions
of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers
and at meetings of the ACP-EEC Joint
Assembly, drawn attention to the plight
and living conditions of their nationals
within the Community.
The areas of concern to the ACP
Group have been several including the
following:
a) Freedom of Entry: Concern has been
expressed at the restrictions imposed on
the entry of ACP nationals to Member
States of the Community following recent
waves of migration from East and Cen-
tral Europe, from the traditional supply-
ing areas of the Mediterranean region
and some ACP States. Those restrictions
also hinder the entry of students and
asylum seekers.
b) Freedom of Movement: Several
Member States of the Community grant
only short or medium term residence
permits which restrict the migrants to
specific jobs or, sometimes, to specific
places. Restrictions on job or profes-
sional mobility severely inhibit social
mobility and make integration difficult.
A lack of freedom .of movement will
maintain the fragmentation of the labour
market within the Community, thus
perpetuating a situation in which immigr-
ants remain at the bottom of the social
and economic ladders.
c) Education: The ACP Group has been
concerned at the relative scarcity of
educational opportunities available to
migrants. The Group has emphasised
that greater attention should be paid to
vocational training and retraining to
enable immigrants to keep abreast of
developments, especially technological
changes, so as to make them competitive
with the nationals of Member States in
which they live.
---'--' , -~- --------,~--,-
d) Housing: The living conditions of
immigrants in inner cities where housing,
health and educational facilities are
inadequate have been a major source of
concern. The absence of an integration
policy, backed by housing plans for
immigrants, is a root cause of the immigr-
ant  ghetto now found in most cities
within the Community.
e) Growing Phenomenon of Racism:
Racism and xenophobia have been on the
rise in spite of their condemnation by all
parties. The European  Declaration
against Racism and Xenophobia  was
adopted in June 1986 by the European
Parliament but since then, acts of per-
sonal harassment, physical attacks, dis-
crimination in housing, employment and
pay have not declined. On the contrary,
they have been reported in increasing
numbers.
f) Civil and Political Rights: Immigrants
have been excluded from exercising most
political rights in their host country. Such
rights have been made available in some
Member States but they are made con-
ditional on the acquisition of nationality
of the host country, which is likely to be a
long and tedious process.
ACP quest for better treatment
The ACP Group has considered that
the protection of the rights of migrants
should be discussed in the context of
human rights norms which have been
accepted by all States party to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
adopted by the United Nations. Thus, in
the Lome IV Convention, the provision
dealing with the situation of students and
migrant workers has been linked with the
commitment of the Contracting Parties
to the obligations under '
...... 
inter-
national law to strive to eliminate all forms
of discrimination based on ethnic group,
origin, race, nationality, colour, sex,
language religion or any other
situation.  ' (3)
Under that provision, the Member
States (and/or, where appropriate, the
Community) and the ACP States '00.  will
continue to ensure, through the legal or
administrative measures which -theyh'(tve
or will have adopted that migrant workers
students and otherforeign nationals legally
within their territory are not subjected to
discrimination on the basis of racial
,---
(3) Article 5, paragraph 2, Fourth ACP-EEC
Convention
religious, cultural or social differences
notably in respect of housing, education
healtheare, other social services and em-
ployment. 
Those elements are enshrined in a
provision which, situated in the main
body of the Convention, represents an
improvement over the Lome III Conven-
tion which relegated the subject of stud-
ents and migrant workers, to its An-
nex IX.
Annex V of Lome IV extends the fun-
damental freedoms, as they derive from
the general principles of international
law, to workers legally carrying out an
activity within the Community. It also
provides for measures to assist non-
governmental organisations in the Com-
munity to improve social and cultural
facilities for workers who are ACP
nationals and provides for financial
support for programmes aimed at the
training of ACP nationals returning
home to permit their re-integration in
well-defined fields
ACP States have agreed to discourage
their nationals from irregular migration
into the Community. It was also agreed
that matters relating to the situation of
students and migrant workers should be
referred to the Council of Ministers '
appropriate
Both parties have agreed, in Annex VI
of Lome IV, to accord to workers legally
employed in each others' territory, treat-
ment free from discrimination with re-
spect to working conditions and pay as
well as social security benefits linked to
employment. That provision shall not
affect the rights and obligations of ACP
States and Member States of the Coin-
munity where those agreements provide
for more favourable treatment for
nationals of ACP States and of Members
States. It is agreed that matters relating to
employment, pay .and social security
would be resolved, if necessary, through
bilateral negotiation.
While Lome IV does represent some
improvement upon its predecessor
Lome III, in its provisions on migration
issues, it is fairly restrictive when com-
pared with the standards set by the
international community. There is some
scope for improvement.
That fact has not been missed by the
Joint Assembly of ACP-EEC Parliamen-
tarians which has debated the issues
relating to the situation of ACP nationals
and other immigrants generally, at many
of its sessions. During its meeting in
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Joint Assembly approved a Resolution
ACP"EEC I 86/90/fin, on 'Immigrant
Rights' which inter alia expressed the
wish that all Member States begin the
process of regularising the situation of all
political and economic immigrants who
are  correctly working and residing illeg"
ally in the country concerned' The process
was to be  simple, rapid and generalised.
without restrictive clauses, and to be
carried out with sufficient publicity.....
Member States were also invited, in the
Resolution, to do the following:
. Undertake a policy of integration
which guaranteed equal rights and treat"
ment for all residents.
. Recognise the inalienable right of N
families to live together. 
.. Define long"term immigration policies ~
which ensure family reunification as well ~
as the enjoyment of other rights by 
immigrants.
International standards
As noted earlier, the link between the
protection of the rights of migrants and
the obligation and commitment to
human rights under international law has
been recognised in Lome IV. The part"
ners, the ACP States and Member States
of the Community, are thus committed to
the observance of the international stan"
dards set by the United Nations and its
agencies notably the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva, in
the formulation and implementation of
policies regarding the welfare of migrant
workers. Such standards, as detailed in
various United Nations and ILO Con-
ventions, are universal and represent the
minimum standards below which treat-
ment of migrants should not fall.
The Migration for Employment Con-
vention (Revised), 1949 and the Migrant
Workers Convention (Supplementary
Provisions), 1975 are two instruments
adopted by the ILO which, together with'
two Conventions on Social Security, have
set out the minimum standards to which
those states which subscribe to the
principles of international law, should
adhere.
A draft United Nations Convention
I currently being negotiated, seeks t
' extend basic human rights not only to
legally resident migrants but also to
! undocumented or irregular migrants.
' Under this draft Convention, additional
rights would be accorded to lawfully
L_. . u
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resident migrants while recognition
would be given to the rights of several
categories of migrant e. , frontier work"
ers, seasonal workers, projeeHied work-
ers.
One helpful observation, from the
ACP perspective, which suggests itself, is
that all Member States of the Community
which have not yet ratified the ILO and
United Nations Conventions should con-
sider doing so soon and should then
ensure that their provisions are effectively
applied in their countries. (4
The Single Market and
migration policy
The advent of the single, internal
market makes it a matter of urgency that
Member States review their migration
policies. When the internal frontiers are
finally removed, the solution of the
immigration problem in one Member
State will probably become a matter for
all Member States. It is also likely that the
achievement of the single market will
increase the attraction of the Community
as a venue of new migration, particularly
if the single market of~'the Community
demonstrates the expected growth while
conditions in the devel~ping w()'fld stag-
nate or worsen.
There is a certain concern among the
ACP States when note is taken of
(4) Eight Member States have ratified the 1949
I LO Convention while only six have ratified the 1975
ILO Convention.
. --_._.._-~--------- -_..._--- .. - ~-.-..,
declarations such as that in an Appendix
to the Single European Act:
Nothing in these provisions shall affect
the right of Member States to take
measures as they consider necessary for
controlling immigration from third coun-
tries, and to combat terrorism, crime, the
traffic of drugs and illicit trading in works
of art and antiques
One must respect the right of states to
protect against the recognisably negative
effects of most of the areas listed in the
Appendix but it must surely be viewed as
unfortunate that immigration has been
lumped together with criminal and other
undesirable activities. More specifically,
the declaration seems to give the freedom
to a particular Member State or group of
states to formulate laws relating to
immigration and implement them irre-
spective of whether they conflict with
Community law or not.
There are several proposals now being
made which will demand urgent Com-
munity attention as they will materially
affect a frontier-free Community (5).
a) The abolition of controls on the
movement of non-EEC nationals from
one host state to other EEC states. Such a
development would increase economic
and social mobility. The access to em-
ployment in other EEC States would be
improved if restrictions which limit
(OJ The proposals are partially drawn from the
World Employment Programme, 1LO, 1990 and
other sources.immigrants to specific jobs over a specific
time peri ad in one country are lifted.
b) The opening-up of employment in the
public sector to nan-EEC nationals (i.
outside the sectors which are considered
sensitive in terms of policy-making).
c) In accordance with the principle that
the family is to be protected by the society
and the State, Member States should
consider facilitating the reunification of
families of all migrant workers legally
residing in their territories.
d) The international dimension of irre-
gular migration requires that ACP and
Community States cooperate fully in the
fight against illegal entry and migration.
His desirable, however, that, after having
resided in a Member State for a certain
period of time, the migrant Can claim
certain fundamental rights, including
rights arising from the exercise of re-
munerative activity. The positian af the
irregular migrant should, therefare, be
regularised after a certain period of stay.




Migration policy in the Community,
post"Single Market, can be either a
cammon policy adopted at Community
level or a harmonisationof natianal
policies or a mere coCirdination of natianal
policies. What that p01icy sho.uld be based
on is a realisatian that some level of
immigration to the Community is in-
evitable for economic reasons prevailing
both in the host and sending country, for
reasons of international cooperation and
for humanitarian reasons.
The effarts being made, thus far, to
forge varying levels af common or shared
policy have all presented problems. The
Schengen Agreement adopted by the
Benelux, France and Germany (and
possibly saon by others) and the Draft
Canvention for the Crossing of Borders
(nat yet made public) have both been
highlighted by Amnesty International as
pasing particular problems if enacted as
proposed. So, too, has the Convention
for the Determination of the State Re-
sponsible for Examining Requests for
Asylum (Dublin).
Areas such as refugee determination
sanctions against transporters, refusal of
entry, deportation of refugee seekers and
differing standards of admission of non-
EEC nationals, have all been pinpointed
as matters of concern.
The 'Brain-drain
A matter of continuing concern to
ACP States has been the search far a
solution to the outflaw af skills and the
encouragement of a return af skilled
personnel who can contribute to. the
economic and social life of their states.
The ACP has called on the Community,
in the past, to cooperate in finding a
solution to. that problem.
Some measures which can be taken and
which may help include 
. the allocatian of meaningful resources
for education and training at home;
. financial and technical resources to
encourage South-South education and
training exchange;
. support for initiatives aimed at creating
training-cum-research internships based
C',
:;; ' . ;:; ~
ff. '
!//hile limitations may be applied to A CP narimwJs' inm'emenl' in the Community,
t here is m/ increase of specific food product imports
- -""'-""-'-'-"""-- "----'------~~-' -------'---"---- ----- - -
on technical caoperation in the develo.p-
ing countries, all concepts whose aim is to
facilitate the return and effective reinteg-
ration of qualified nationals;
. the avo.idance of the use ofskill-based
criteria in Community integration policy
for admitting new immigrants such as
engineers and scientists.
The immigration pressure now coming
from developing countries is the result o.f
complex factors, including some outside
the contro.l of developing countries.
The continuing affiuence enjoyed by
EC Member States has become a mag-
netic attraction for immigrants from
elsewhere, just as Europeans were attrac-
ted, in the not too distant past, to other
parts of the world.
Some o.bservers of the migration prab-
lem have agreed that the so.lution to the
problems lies in continued expansion of
aid. This is to be considered a lang-term
solution. Such cooperation should, in any
event, be combined, in the short-and
medium-term, with common manage-
ment of migratory flo.ws, some experts
believe.
In recommending a major role for aid,
the disruptive influence o.f the inter-
national environment, in particular, the
cantinuing fall in co.mmodity prices and
the worsening in the terms of trade of the
developing cauntries, has not been ad-
equately highlighted. The recent spread
of economic deprivation in the develop-
ing cauntries, including the ACP States
can be traced partly to this factor.
Assistance programmes in population
co.ntrol have also been mentioned as an
impartant element in future cooperation
aimed at improving the standard ofliving
of the developing countries, thereby
enabling them to retain at home the
skilled and professional services which
will contribute to. the well-being af their
population.
There is a need for consultation be-
tween the Community and independent
badies concerned with refugee matters
regarding the design of palicies and
procedures governing refugees' entry and
their protection under international law.
The need to. refine immigratio.n policies
generally and streamline the implemen-
tation of such palicies should take into
account the long-standing histarieal and
cultural relations between Member States
and ACP States and the need for the latter
to acquire necessary technology and
knaw-how for their own development.o
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Thirty years of Turkish  immigration
October 1991 brings round the 30th
anniversary of the Recruiting Agreement
between the Republic of Turkey and the
Federal Republic of Germany and we
would like to mark this anniversary by
reviewing how migration from Turkey
developed. At the time the Agreement
was signed, and in the first ten years
thereafter, it was clearly assumed, par-
ticularly by the migrants concerned, that
emigration would be a temporary pheno-
menon.
On the German side, the expectation
was that the Recruiting Agreement would
channel as many healthy young workers
as possible into manufacturing. Also
importing labour was profitable for the
host country since it eliminated the need
for the kind of investment normally
required to prepare the human being for
the labour market. As a 1971 colloquium
in Tarquinia in Italy showed, educating
an Italian until he Was 18 cost LIT 6 mil-
lion.
For the Republic of Turkey, the aim
was to reduce unemployment and in-
crease the inflow of foreign currency.
And the migrants themselves were
hoping to return with big savings and
then to set themselves up independently.
The post-war period was characterised
by heavy investment and the founding of
many new undertakings, all possible
inler alia because of the Marshall Plan
and other reconstruction programmes
financed by various western countries. A
feature of this period of expansion was
the enormous demand for labour which
the domestic population was unable to
satisfy,  inter alia because of the particular
demographic circumstances, because the
legal ages for leaving school and training
college had been raised and the working
week shortened from 46. 1 to 4I.l hours
and because Germany was rearming (this
alone made 500 000 people unavailable
for the labour market). The first Recruit-
) Official of GDF (G6cmcn Dernekleri Fede-
rasyonu) _.. Verband Tiirkischer Vereine-- Dussel-
dorf(FRG). M. Aks6yek is also Secretary General of
the FC Migrant Forum set up by the Commission
Directoratorate General for Employment. Industrial
Relations and Social/\rfairs (DGV).
. ---- ~--_.._._--_.__._--- - ._.. ..~-_._--_._. -~- _.. ..._._.
by Dr Ataman AKSOYEK (*
ing Agreement was negotiated with Italy
in 1955 and was followed by the one with
Turkey in 1961 and others with Yugo-
slavia and Spain. With these Agreements
the Federal Republic returned to a
tradition of the  German Reich  inside
whose borders there were half a million
immigrants in 1895. Just before the First
World War, the figure was as much as 1.2
million.
After the building of the Wall in
August 1961 , the possibility of making
good labour shortages from the ranks of
refugees also dried up. From then on the
labour market began to be .characterised
by a duality based on nationality. Pro"
motions now went to German workers
and staff whilst the physically demanding
work, which was frequently also more
dangerous and more likely to have a
deleterious effect on health, was done by
the foreign labourers.
Trends in the migration from
Turkey
At least three phases can be dis-
tinguished in the history of migration
from Turkey:
From 1961 to the 1966/67 recession
During this phase, all parties, namely
the two governments, the migrants and
the entrepreneurs in the Federal Re-
public, worked on the principle of ro-
tation, it being assumed that the migrants
would be working only temporarily in the
Federal Republic (i.e. two-three years
each). The recruiting centres opened by
the Federal Republic in Ankara, Istanbul
and Izmir applied very strict selection
standards to the migrants. They had to
submit to health checks and show evi-
dence of skills before they could obtain
the 'longed-for' permit., A.s a result, in
their own country, the.' ~igrants were
among the best qualifiedpeop-I~. Further-
more, their departure did u"~t"Signifi~-
antly reduce unemployment. Most of the
migrants had jobs and, because of their
qualifications, were generally not easy to
replace.
The rotation principle manifested itself I
particularly during the 1966/67 recession. I
From 1968 to the recruiting ban in 1973
This period was characterised by maSS-
ive recruitment after the end of the
recession because of the Federal Repub-
lic s great need for labour. It was a
question of having to meet growing
demand. As a result, qualification re-
quirements for migrants were lowered
and there was another difference - by
contrast with the early migrants, most of
the newcomers came from country areas.
During this period employers also
started coming round to the view that the
rotation principle held disadvantages as
well as advantages for production.
At this point there was still no question
of women immigrants. There were very
few families among the migrants.
1973 to the present day
Following the recruiting ban, the
pattern of migrant workers' movements
from Turkey changed. Further recruiting
was now no longer possible and the years
1970s became a period of consolidation.
With the exception of 1975 when some
140 000 migrants returned to Turkey,
there were no significant numbers of
returnees. The characteristic of this
period was that, on average, the immigr-
ants stayed in Germany longer .and
brought their families over to join them
as was possible after 1974.
By the mid-seventies at the latest the
migrations had turned into immigration.
Efforts by the Federal Government to
promote a return to the country of origin
particularly after the change of govern-
ment in the eighties, were only tem-
porarily successful in producing a situ-
ation where departures exceed arrivals
and the number of Turks living in
Germany decreased in real terms. In
1985, after dropping to an all-time low
the number of Turks in Germany began
increasing again steadily and by De-
cember 1989 the Federal Republic .of
Germany had a total of 1.612 million
immigrants from Turkey. Some 36% of
this immigrant population are employed
persons subject to the laws on socialinsurance (as compared  to  60% in 1973)
and approximately 64000 are unem-
ployed.
With one in three immigrants in the
FRG coming from Turkey this makes
Turks the largest immigrant group in the
country.
The demographic characteristics of
this population are coming increasingly
to resemble those of the indigenous
German population.
The proportions of women and men
(47 and 53% respectively) are now almost
the same as for the German population.
49 000 of the children  born  in the Federal
Republic in 1989 were  born to  Turkish
immigrants. All these figures show that
these immigrants regard the FRG as their
hearth and home rather than as a tem-
porary place of abode. Further evidence
is the time they stay in the Federal
Republic. As is clear from studies, 60% of
the Turks in the Federal Republic have
been there for ten years or more.
Another indicator suggesting immig-
ration rather than temporary migration is
that 45 000 immigrants from Turkey have
bought a home in the Federal Republic
and that this trend is on the increase. A
total of 135 000 immigrants from Turkey
have opened building society accounts. 
..:
Unemployment does not automal1- 
:;;;
cally mean a return  to  Turkey as used  to 
be the case in the sixties and early 
seventies.
The second generation
For the so-called second generation
the tendency to regard the Federal
Republic as their home is even stronger.
For them Turkey is, at best, a country
where they  go  on holiday or where most
of their relatives live. But it is  not 
realistic alternative. Only momentarily,
when they are frustrated with the situ-
ation in the Federal Republic, will they
say that they are considering returning 
Turkey  to  live.
Most of the second generation arrived
here as small children or were  born  here
and they find themselves at the centre of
much tension and conflict. On the one
hand these young people no longer have
language difficulties, are increasingly
better educated and their expectations as
regards jobs, training and social life are
very similar to those of young Germans.
On the other hand Turkish young people
constantly see their German peers being
Turkish immigrants iiE Em"ope  In Germany 'most of the second generation arrived
as small children 01' were BorEl there and they flnd themselves at the celztre of much
teusion and ctmjlict
given priority when it comes  to  jobs
places on training courses or accommod- i ation. Unlike their parents, they are also
in closer contact with their German peers
and are therefore much more aware of
being passed over.
To  all this must be added the economic
and social problems that have resulted
from unification with the former GDR
and the growing racism and xenophobia
increasingly  to  be met in cert~i11,Jayersof
German society.
Vocational diversification
Over the years immigrants from
Turkey have increasingly diversified into
different vocational areas so that the
Federal Republic of Germany now has
some 4000 Turkish teachers, 953 doc-
.._._...._._._.--- _._-_.~---- --- ~~----~_.__.
tors, 500 social workers, 150 artists, 200
trade union representatives, 30 members
of the professions and some 130 free lance
journalists  these figures including both
men and women.
Another interesting phenomenon is
that more and more immigrants to the
Federal Republic are building up in-
dependent businesses. Thirty years ago
nobody would have dreamt of a develop-
ment of this kind. From a study carried
out by the Centre for Turkish Studies in
Bonn it can be seen that in 1990 there
were 33000 independent entrepreneurs
among the Turkish immigrants (there is a
total of 140 000 immigrant undertakings
in the FRG). This particular sector of
independent entrepreneurs, 30% 
whom are under 35 years old and 10%
women, is constantly growing and has
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become an important factor in the
economy of both the Federal Republic
and Turkey. Most of the undertakings are
in tourism, food, restaurants, retailing
and the services sector. Whereas immigr-
ants from Italy, Spain, Greece and
Yugoslavia have concentrated on four
sectors, immigrants from Turkey have set
up independently in a total of 55 sectors.
Their undertakings are significant for
the economy as a whole. For instance
they have created more than 100 000 new
jobs. According to the study by the
Centre for Turkish Studies, their 1988
turnover was some DM 780 000 and an
average DM 174 000 was invested per
undertaking. The equivalent sum for
1990 was DM 5.7 billion and it is es-
timated that their combined volume of
consumption amounted to more than
DM 25 billion. In the meantime their
ranks include 12 specialist tour operators
who sold more than 200 000 package
trips to Turkey in 1989.
Largely through the work of general
consulates, a whole infrastructure for
small and medium-sized business is de-
veloping and businessmen s associations
are being formed whilst at the Same time
business consultancies are being formed
and Turkish banks are opening more and
more agencies and branches in the Fe-
deral Republic. Surveys made in 1990
show that there is also a marked tendency
among independent entrepreneurs to






settle in the f"ederal Republic, this fact
cnntinues to be ignored by the Federal
Repuhlic s current policy. There is still no
questinn of introducing a policy on
rorcigners; the latter is still primarily
dictated by the labour market.
Opportunities for participating in po-
litics are also extremely limited. Many
immigrants become members of political
parties -- for instance 2.5% of SPD
members (i.e. 24 000) are foreigners. A
recent judgment by the Federal Consti.
tutional Court nevertheless still refuses
immigrants the right to vote or stand in
local elections. Yet in the Netherlands
this is an undisputed component oflocal
government. Local councils in Germany
have foreigners' advisory committees
but then, thaUs the point - they are only
advisory.
In spite of protests by organisations
representing immigrants, charitable as-
sociations, churches and trade unions
another restrictive law on foreigners was
adopted in 1990. This remains entirely
true to the tradition which started with
the adoption of the 'PreuBisches AlI-
gemeines Landrecht' of 1794 and has
been maintained to the present day by
way of the special laws promulgated by
imperial Germany. In this connection it is
frightening to realise that the policy
regulation on foreigners issued in
March 1938 was retained by the newly
founded Federal Republic in 1951.
The general tenor of the law has never
changed. Now, as then, the main interest
is in economic matters, not in the human
beings affected by the law. Granting a
person the right to reside in the country is
regarded as a favour but the uncertainties
surrounding the law governing the re-
sidential permit still remain, as does the
State s power of decision - termed its
discretionary powers. Even under the
new law on foreigners the latter are still
regarded first and foremost as disturbers
of the peace and integration means toeing
the line, with the possibility thatthis may
be 'rewarded' with citizenship once the
previous nationality has been renounced.
Like all otherimmigrants from non-EEC
countries, Turkish immigrants belong to
the group with the fewest rights and
greatest uncertanty as regards residential
status, even if they have lived in the
Federal Republic for years.
On 15 July 1991 the Federal Govern-
ment's appointee with responsibility for
foreigners and the integration of foreign
..._..._---------"------------...,--,------------_ ._------,~ - -------
- - ____m___,__-----,...
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The Federal Republic s policy
on foreigners
Although, as we have seen, there is a
clear tendency for Turkish immigrants toworkers and their families resigned her
post, giving the following reasons:
I. her office was understaffed as she had
at her disposal a total of only four
executive and no administrative officials;
2. the work of her office had been
rendered particularly difficult by a lack of
support by the Federal Government and
the political parties. 'All those working
for peaceful coexistence in our society feel
let down by the people who are officially
responsible. '
Mrs Funcke expressed the hope that
the step she was taking would finally
highlight the need for 'rethinking policy
on integration and migration and adapt-
ing it to the tasks in question . Mrs
Funcke gave as a further reason for the
resignation the fact that the growing
xenophobia in the new Federal Lander
represented a danger signal. The aim of
guaranteeing immigrants legal and social .
equality had to be clearly demonstrated ~
both in law, e.g. throughananti-discrimi- ~
nation law and a law on the right to settle
, IL
and through official public .action.
Turkish immigrant organisations
The first Turkish immigrant organis-
ations were established in the late sixties
and early seventies. The founder mem-
bers were usually migrants with a good
command of German who, through the
self-help organisations, helped their com-
patriots with their many day-to-day
problems.
In the seventies and eighties the nature
of these organisations changed as, follow-
ing the military coup of21 March 1971
and the coup of 12 September 1980, many
political refugees came to the Federal
Republic. This was a period when poli-
tical developments in Turkey were as
much a focus of activity as working for
equal rights in the Federal Republic. The
late eighties saw the further expansion of
these organisations. Discussions on the
nature of an immigrant organisation took
a new direction. The most important
outcome was a decision that the organis-
ationsshould concentrate primarily on
the independent representation of the
interests of immigrants in their host
country as it was assumed that immigr-
ants would be staying for long periods.
The immigrant organisations playa big
part in articulating the interests of im-
migrants in public. In many instances
they act as trail blazer  in other words
their demands are taken up by trade
unions, with which the organisations
Although there is a clear tefll:iJJCICY for Turkish immigrants to settle in the Fedet'
Republic of Germany las well as everywhel'e in Europe  above in Brussels/, this
fact continues to be ~f;nored by the cm'rent German policy
generally have close contacts, and by
political parties.
The immigrant organisations receive
hardly any support from the authorities.
They have to cover running costs and
activities from members' contributions
and this greatly restricts their ability to
act. A comparison with conditions in
other EEC countries shows that of all
immigrant organisations, those in the
Federal Republic have the greatest dif-
ficulties to face.
What was originally officially establi-
shed in October 1961 as a system of
foreigners taking shorHerm employment
in the Federal Republic first became an
institution and has now turned into a
process of immigration,
The immigrants are an important
factor in the manufacturing sector and
contribute in the same prGportipn as the
native population to tax revenues:
The demographic figures for iinmigE~
ants from Turkey are coming into line
with those for the indigenous population.
The immigrants are still at a disadvantage
I (jobs
, housing and social status) and the
I problems are getting worse as a result of
the process of integrating the former
GDR.
The Federal Government's policy is
unable to deal with the changes. The
Federal Republic is still not recognised in
law as an immigration country.
The second generation regards the
Federal Republic as its home. The young
people are better educated' and their
expectations with regard to jobs and
living conditions are greater and resemble
those of their German peers. They are
more directly aware than their parents of
the discrimination and growing xeno-
phobia.
Where work is concerned, the Turkish
immigrant population has diversified.
Turks no longer work exclusively in
manufacturing; the tendency to seek
employment in the services sector is
growmg.
The independent entrepreneurs are an
entirely new phenomenon and are a
factor in the economic expansion of both
the Federal Republic and Turkey.
We are at the threshold of a new
multicultural and multicoloured Europe.
Immigrants from non-EEC countries
who are contributing their share to the
building of the new Europe should not be
the object of discrimination; they should
have equal rights.o A.
. -.-.- -------- - -...  -.- ----- 
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The Community Social Charter should apply
to all  workers
Migrant workers from third countries
was the topic of a conference organised
by the EC Economic and Social Commit-
tee (ESC) and the European Parliament
in Luxembourg, in June 1991.
Migratory patterns (causes and
trends), right to social protection, stan-
dards of living and living conditions;
right to education and vocational train-
ing, access to employment; right of entry
and residence, right to reunite families;
right to freedom of movement; civil
rights, the situation of immigrant women
political and social integration: each of
these topics Was the subject of a debate
introduced by an expert and presided
over by an MEP or an ESC member.
For their.firstjoint conference ever, the
ESC and the European Parliament had
chosen a particularly difficult topic. A
few days before the conference started, an
outburst of violence had taken place
between 'second generation' youngsters
and French police in a Parisian suburb.
In fact, the two opening speakers were
French: Nicole Pery, who spoke on
behalf of EP President Baron Crespo, and
Fran90is Staedelin, ESC President. It was
significant that both ofthem should recall
the old French May 1968 slogan of  Vivre
et travailler au pays ('live and work in
one s own country ), reminiscent of the
Larzac farmers' non-violent resistence to
the planned extension of a French Army
training camp...
Practical solutions were what Fran90is
Staedclin expected from this conference
Community solutions, for it is all to easy
to say this is a national problem ). He
suggested one or two himself: Western
European firms should invest in Eastern
Europe to help workers carryon working
and living in their country. He also
suggested that the EC should have a
lodging policy:  'The Coal and Steel
Community had one, why /1ot the EcO/1-
omic Community?'
As for Nicole Pery, she suggested that
all cooperation agreements between the
) Ese Press Service.
.-.------.- ..-.----
by Francis WHYTE (*
EC and an Eastern European or
Southern Hemisphere country should
include a clause on migrant workers.
Both speakers agreed that the EC
should remain open to migrants but the
EC must say under what conditions
stressed Fran90is Staedelin.
Vivre et travailler au pays ? Jean-
Claude Junker, Luxembourg Finance
and Labour Minister seemed to agree
with the slogan. He informed the con-
ference that on 23-24 April, EC Labour
ministers had made it clear to their
Eastern European counter-parts, that
they did not want the EC to become the
natural recipient for  migratory presswes
coming from Eastern Europe. Instead
EC Member States should coordinate the
type of on-the-spot training they are
prepared to give to Eastern European
workers. One of the arguments put
forward by Mr Juncker was that the EC
wanted to carryon welcoming refugees
from all over the world seeking political
asylum.
One of the most spectacular practical
suggestions was that put forward by
Belgian expert D. Pieters of creating a
thirteenth' social protection system spe-
cially for migrant workers, instead of
harmonising all twelve Member States
systems. 'Harmonisation would lead to
such a complicated system that it is better
to look for an alternative , he stressed.
The International Labour Organis-
ation should be involved in the way the
EC helps third countries, so that the
social partners there may playa con-
sultative role, suggested B. Mourgues
(Workers' Group, Fra,nce), who had just
come back from a meetlng with Maghreb
area trade-unions in Tuni~:  'They all fear
that Europe will close its doors dJti!ii  1993':
Other speakers suggested concentrat-
ing EC financial help on countries with
the greatest emigration potential. But
B. Fayot (Socialist, Luxembourg) re-
called that Northern States had already
tried to influence policies of 'under-
developed' States in the past with disastr-
ous effect, especially in the field of
demography. For people who had al-
ready emigrated to the EC, he advocated
participation rather than paternalism: '
is up to public services in the welcoming
States to respect the language and culture
of the migrant workers
The Shengen Agreement
criticised
You can teach us as many languages as
you like  " replied a representative of a
migrant workers organisation.  It will not
make us feel equal. We carry our passport
on our face
Third country migrant workers should
be able to move around the EC just like
any other Community citizen, said
A. Amato (Workers' Group, Italy), rap-
porteur of the ESC's own-initiative
opinion adopted last April. They should
also be able to work anywhere in the EC.
Mr Bomtempi (GUE, Italy) suggested
drawing up a charter of fundamental




criticised the Shengen agreement signed
at the beginning of the year by the
Benelux, France, Germany and Italy to
allow free circulation between themsel-
ves:  'This agreement abolishes the prin-
ciple of controlling the legal basis of
administrative procedures
One of the most lively interventions
was that of young French Green MEP
Mrs Tazda"it. She suggested that in the
future, a Commission Vice-President
should be appointed to deal with mig-
ratory patterns and racism.
Domingo Segarra (GUE, Spain) said
that the next EC treaty should include a
chapter recognising citizenship to those
who are working in the Community.
'I've never seen such unanimity before in
favour of a fairer treament for the EC'
eight million immigrant workers said
Vasco Cat, a Portuguese trade-unionist
------.---The ice cream trade  one profession which has benefited from free movement
Chairman of the ESC's Social Affairs
section, interviewed by Reuter straight
after the conference.
Indeed, all the participants agreed that
it was high time a 'positive' image be
given of migrant workers and their
families. As Vasco Cal said in his conclu-
sion:  The immigrants contribute- posit-
ively to the economic development and the
construction of the type of open, pluricul-
tural societies which characterise the Ec.
Their contribution to social security
schemes can solve the financial problems
caused by the EC's demographic deficit.
The role of immigrants must be enhanced
in the eyes of Member States' public
opinion. This will help change mentalities.
improve integration and fight racism
It is necessary to harmonise and even
coordinate Member States policies when
they affect immigration. Cooperation
and development policies should en~
courage potential migrants to stay at
home and help those who want to go
back. All agreements on immigration
should become multilateral. National
social security systems of EC and EFT A
Member States should converge. Policies
dealing with visas, asylum, residence and
family grouping should be coordinated
taking into account ILO conventions and
recommendations
' .
More should be done to collect data on
immigration at EC level. Each Member
State should be encouraged to have a
national immigration policy. At the same
time, the first steps must be taken towards
a Community immigration policy which
would provide the legal framework to
solve all the problems raised during the
conference.
There was consensus on the principle
of equality of treatment for the ilmnigr-
ants and their farnilies who are legally
established in a Member State. This
should have an effect on social policy,
access to education, health, security on
the work place, social security and free
circulation within the Ec.
The Charter of fundamental social
Community rights should apply to all
workers, to counter atypical and clandes-
tine work which most migrants come
across.
The best way to counter racial discrimi-
nation is to help immigrariis' integrate
social structures such as unions, as~oci-
ations, existing educational and profes-
sional training systems. They must have
decent lodging and health protection.
The status of migrant women should
not depend on their family situation.
Their integration problems must be dealt
with specifically.
-,--.-----.--.
Civil rights and the right to vote in local
and municipal elections is also a good
way of integrating migrants who have
definitely setlled down in a Member
State.
As Vasco Cal said at the end of his
conclusion the fact thatfor theftrst time,
the European Parliament and the EC
Economic and Social Committee have
taken the initiative of or gani sing together a
conference clearly shows to the EC deci-
sion-makers that members of the EP and
socio-professional representatives of the
EC agree on how important those problems
are and how urgent it is to deal with them in
an appropriate way at Community level'.
'There will be other, more specific
conferences promised Wim Van Velzen
Chairman of the EP Social Affairs
Commission. He stressed the necessity of
a Charter of migrant citizens' rights and
an EC action programme to help migrant
workers be more informed. Considering
most migrants are here to stay, the EC
must design a policy for the second and
third generation descendants of the first
wave of migration. Although a few
migrants' representatives were present
the conference revealed how difficult it
was to have a genuine migrants' represen-
tation. This problem will become a
crucial issue in the future, he predicted.
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The new context of international migration
An international conference or-
ganised by the OECD took place in
Rome on 13-15 March 1991. We
publish below a resume of three
interventions on 'A new context for




national and international policies
and migration by Juhani Lonnroth
and 'Integration policies in OECD
countries' by Thomas J. Alexander.
The different contributions to the
Rome conference will shortly be
published by the OECD. (I)
Demographic imbalances coupled with
economic imbalances have a considerable
impact on emigration pressures, although
not to the same extent everywhere. When
the gulf between one region and another
widens, the effects on migratory flows
create complex and difficult situations. In 
the developed countries, which have ~
taken many immigrants in the past and ~
still do so today, the structural adjust. 
ment now taking place is creating labour
requirements that differ in quantity and
quality from those of the last three
decades. It also means that they will be
unable to provide work for the growing
numbers of young people in the develop-
ing countries who risk swelling the ranks
of the unemployed and the would-
migrants.
Today immigration can no longer be
seen solely in terms of labour. The
migration process as a whole also in-
volves social policy, which could not meet
its goals if confronted with a massive
influx of new immigrants. A complete
switch from demand-led migration to one
determined essentially by supply would
be bound to swell the flows of clandestine
immigrants, whereas the governments of
the developed countries are doing all they
can to stem those flows and to prevent
employers engaging undeclared workers.
Emigration will not solve the problems
of underdevelopment, rising under-em-
ployment and the economic imbalances
between the North and the South. A new
form of co-operation between developed
and developing countries is now essential.
(I) 2, rue Andre-Pascal, 75775 Paris (France)
Tel.: 45248200.
Should these attractive immigrant children feel African, Carihbean... or European?
One of tfle f,llldedying causes of migmtion is recogllised to be the differential 
wealth between natio!1s. The ljllestioll therefore is whether de;lelopment cooperation
might be a means to stem migration flows from the poor to the deb countries
With the help of the developed countries
the developing countries should orient
their economic growth more specifically
to job creation and setting up social and
institutional structures capable of slow-
ing down demographic pressures. There
are some important examples: some
countries in Asia are experiencing rapid
demographic change alongside remar-
kable economic growth. The countries in
Southern Europe which were tradition-
ally emigration countries have now
become immigration countries.
The recent changes in the nature of
migratory flows have led most govern-
ments to revise their forecasts. The
massive flows of thoseseek.ing asylum in
the DECD countries is driven by econ-
omic rather than political conSidetation1'i
and this trend may well call into question
the very principle of right of asylum. The
political changes in Eastern Europe have
created great uncertainty about East-
West migratory flows. For example, the
difference between the minimum and
maximum figures of potential Soviet
emigrants is so wide that it is practically
impossible to plan migration policies.
Nevertheless, the freedom to travel
sanctioned by the democratic change now
under way in the East European countries
cannot be taken in the present situation to
mean freedom to settle in the more
developed countries. Recent multi-
national negotiations have aimed at
contributing to better control of mig-
ratory flows and to the exchange 
information on the economic and social
policies to promote employment as the
best alternative to East-West migration.
Despite the many studies and analyses
of migration, some questions still remain
unanswered, largely, no doubt, because
migration is an economic, social and
cultural phenomenon that builds up over
the long term. Because of the fact that the
democratic countries respect humani-
tarian principles and because of the
networks established by migrants , the
issue of migration mobilises interest
-.--groups which sometimes makes the intro-





One of the underlying causes of mig-
ration is recognised  to  be the differential
of wealth between nations. An obvious
question therefore is whether develop-
ment cooperation between the indus-
trialised and the developing countries
might be a means to stem migration flows
from the poor  to  the rich .countries. The ~
evidence shows however that the link 
between economic development and mig- ~
ration is not a straightforward one but 
can be paradoxical. In other words, better
economic performance resulting from
development cooperation could 
least in the short run ~ accelerate
migration flows rather than reduce emig-
ration pressures. Even the rapidly grow-
ing countries of South East Asia continue
to be emigration countries because earn-
ing differentials with receiving countries
have persisted.
Apart from differential demographic
trends, there are other factors which 
for the time being -,- operate against a
narrowing of per capita incomes and thus
a reduction of potential migration flows
from the South to the North.  To  name a
few: due  to  the indebtness of many
developing countries capital flows  go 
the wrong direction, i.e. from the South
to the North; information technologies
permit considerable flexibility of enter-
prises in responding cost-effectively to
demand shifts and  do  not favour the
reallocation of enterprises to developing
countries; often foreign direct invest-
ments are not forthcoming because of
insufficient infrastructure and incon-
sistent domestic policies in the developing
countries; the informal sector has ab"
sorbed considerable labour surpluses in
the developing countries but does not
provide sufficient earnings to prevent
poverty and marginalisation.
In spite of these difficulties it would be
wrong  to  give in to pessimism, New
policy initiativcs, both in the sending and
receiving countries could redress the
situation to a considerable extent and
eventually contribute  to  a curbing of
migration pressures.  To  this end, the
receiving countries would have to take
into consideration the migration impli- I
cations of all their policies but. most of I
._n
__...---.. ..~- ~_._......_._-_._._--
Pictw'c showing immigrants' business in 'Matoilge' (the nickname tOl' the Aft'iean
esidential area of Brussels).  Do  immigrants depress the labour market and do they
compete with the host country s nationals?'
all, trade policy. Protectionist attitudes
towards the developing countries would
further fuel emigration pressures in these
countries.
The developing countries would have
to create domestic conditions which
would be attractive to foreign private
investors and would have to opt for 
development model which favours job
creating growth and human resource
development.  To  achieve the latter they
would have to be assisted by the indus-
trialised countries through appropriate
foreign aid; technical assistance and
other cooperative arrangements. This
type of assistance should not be general
but specific and adapted to national
sectoral and regional circumstances.
It has to be considered however that
developing countries might not be in-
clined to adopt such a policy because
emigration, in the short term, represents a
source of foreign exchange. It will be
important, therefore, to achieve a balance
of net-benefits for sending and receiving
ountries from such international
cooperation arrangements. Searching for
equitable outcomes for both sides will
also enhance the positiv.e  creative and
enriching  effects which it1ternational
migration can generate. These positive
effects are becoming more and 1ilore
apparent in the migration of skilled
labour between industrialised countries
where the contours of an international
labour market are gradually taking
shape. In the developing countries em-
phasis on human resourec development
and 'skill exchange' with the developed
countries can counter the effect of the
brain drain' and reinforce economic
development.
Integration policies in DECD
countries
Do immigrants depress the labour
market and do they compete with the host
country s nationals? When growth is
strong and many new jobs are being
created, it seems that immigrant workers
play an essential complementary role in
the short term and that their presence
does not lead  to  wage cuts for nationals or
long established immigrant populations.
In European and Asian countries
where the economy and the labour
market are in the throes of change, low-
paid and/or poorly qualified nationals
may find themselves in competition with
not only legal but also illegal immigrants.
However, where the presence of immig-
rants, as it sometimes does, generatesjobs
for them (notably in certain traditional
industries and in services), this may allow
nationals, especially those who do not
want to accept uncongenial or badly paid
jobs, to climb up the occupational ladder
(though an analysis over the long term
focusing on specific groupS would not
necessarily come to that conclusion). In
certain immigration countries, improving
the employment situation of foreigners
and young people of foreign origin is still
a matter for concern, and efforts to
provide training to help them acquire
more marketable skills and to combat the
discrimination they sometimes suffer are
key elements of integration policy.
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Managing migratory flows provides a
challenge for the authorities responsible
for supervising and regulating them, and
all the more so when the immigration
possibilities fall far short of the expec-
tations of the many potential migrants
concerned. Countries which have been
experimenting for some time with mig-
ratory flow management policies now
reeognise the importance of pragmatism
and take care to draw up realistic policies
so as not to leave the field free for
demagogic arguments. Some Southern
European countries have had to bring. in a
brand new migration policy post-haste
against a background of accelerating
flows of all kinds. Sometimes, of course
they have based their policies on the
experience of other countries, but they
also have to innovate. While concern to
view migration and development as a
whole is necessary, emergencies still have
to be dealt with swiftly, as recent events
have proved.
In designing their policies to manage
migratory flows the countries concerned
must take effective steps to control illegal
migration, and this may even involve a
partial overhaul of organisation of pro-
duction. At the same time, policies have
to be clearly explained, since their success
depends on an understanding attitude on
the part of the host country population
both native and immigrant.
Throughout their stay in a host
country, immigrants go through many
and varied experiences. The uncertainties
of their lives explain the complexity of
their social needs. Their integration
demands both individual and collective
action. In all countries, social policies for
integration are in practice based partly on
common law and partly on specific
measures. The day-to-day integration of
immigrants requires first the application
of basic principles  for instance, up-
holding equality of rights and duties,
campaigning against all forms of econ-
omic or social discrimination. It is also
necessary to introduce social policies to
improve the quality of life for immigrants
and their children, raising levels of
education and vocational training.
Successful integration also depends on
the immigrants themselves, and especially
on the young and women. In every
immigrant c0l11.munity there are out-
standingly dynamic people whose efforts
to promote integration deserve to be
supported and encouraged.
Immigration and Economy
Immigration as a factor
of development
by Jean-Claude CHESNAIS (*
Although the EEC countries decided to
stop more workers coming in 15 years
ago, immigration is still of prime concern
to public opinion. The migration attend-
ant on imbalances between North and
South cannot be stemmed and conven-
tional means of control are stretched to
their limits. Does this mean we should
share the present pessimism about the
dangers of immigration?
Culturally speaking, this is no small
problem, bearing in mind the relative
homogeneity of the way Europe has been
peopled so far, but as far as the economy
is concerned, we feel that fears are
exaggerated in the case of both home and
host countries. The usual comparison
between the interests of one and the costs
to the other does not apply here, for the
migratory exchange may well be to the
advantage of both suppliers and re-
ceivers.
Let us look briefly at one or two aspects
of migration in Europe since World War
II. The first country of immigration in
absolute terms, and by a long chalk, is
Federal Germany, with a migratory
balance of close to 9 million over the
1950-89 period (and this does not include
the years immediately after the war when
there was an influx of German refugees
from the eastern territories). In contrast
with the dominant views of the experts of
that era, the common view of economic
historians today is that this wave of
immigration was one of the contributors
to the German economic miracle, as by
altering the breakdown between wages
and profits to the benefit of investment, it
stimulated growth.
Two other cases worthy of consider-
ation here are the countries with the
biggest percentages of foreigners in their
) National Institute for Demographic Studies
(INED) - 27, rue du Commandeur - 75675 PARIS
(France).
work force - Luxembourg and Switzer-
land, the most prosperous nations of
Western Europe. This prosperity of
course attracts workers from abroad, but
is it not also (partly at least) the result of
the economic activity of those foreigners
with all the flexibility that it brings to the
economic machinery and the opportu-
nities of promotion it offers the native
populations. The case of Luxembourg
and Switzerland suggests that, once an
active, pragmatic immigration policy
reflecting the needs of the economy has
been set up, the host country can com-
pensate for any weaknesses and increase
its wellbeing by using immigrant labour.
After all, why do those economic prac-
titioners, the businessmen, call on foreign
workers? Clearly because they have
qualities the national workers do not
have - which goes for the highly quali-
fied as well as for the poorly qualified and
unskilled who are in the majority, whom
we hear less about but who make up the
bulk of the migrant population, as they
have always done. Once they have used
up the pool of flexible, hard-working
labour from the rural areas, heads of
firms have to look to less demanding
sources of workers. Unskilled labour for
poorly paid jobs is increasingly difficult
to find because of the massive increase in
the time which both girls and boys spend
in education in European societies and an
increasing number of what are deemed to
be degrading jobs, many of which cannot
be mechanised, are being neglected.
Japan is facing this at the moment, for it
too has become a country of immigration
over the past decade. Does it mean that
immigration is inevitable once a certain
degree of demographic maturity has been
achieved? The development of the pheno-
menon in Southern Europe and East Asia
alike suggests that it is. Immigration can
only be avoided with structural reforms
which are very costly in social and
political ten11.s.A link in
the international chain (2)
Let us now look at the countries of
departure. The argument about the cost
of the brain drain is common today, with
poorly developed nations worried about
losing their best people and compromis-
ing their chances of development for
some time to come. This could indeed be
the outcome, particularly if the host
country is not democratic and has no
proper development policy and no op-
portunities to offer its young people, but
it assumes that all migrants intend to
break their ties and settle abroad for
good. However, migration is in fact a
step-by-step process which reflects trends
in the comparative situation of host and
home countries and there is usually a
great deal of coming and going if circum-
stances are right. Lastly, many migrants
go home, armed with knowledge, know-
how, training and money , sooner or later.
Migration is a long period of learning,
a link in the chain of international
exchange, and the visible .consequences
are small in comparison with the hidden
non "measurable consequences which go
deeper and are no doubt more important
in the long run. It is a process of
transmitting ideas and values and it helps
change behaviour and customs in the
countries affected by emigration, altering
outlooks and passing on hitherto un-
known reflexes and habits and thereby
indirectly speeding up innovation. Lastly,
it creates the strongest support for the
establishment of exchanges of all kind
between host and home country. Immi-
grants are human vehicles of technical
progress and, as such, unwitting cooper-
ation operatives. There again, the secular
experience of the major European coun-
tries of emigration suggests that the .
pessimism of the current thinking on ~
migration is relative. None of them ~
Ireland, Italy, Spain or Portugal ~ have 
been condemned to under-development.
What is more, their performances over
the past 20 years have been outstanding.
Not long ago, they were still being called
traditional' , but they have caught up in
many ways and stepped resolutely into
modernism. Is it really likely that mig-
ration did more to hinder this develop-
men t than hasten it'!
(') Eel. subtitle.
The textile industry is one of the main utilisel's of immigl'al!t manpower in the
Community 
-.:- 
Above: a fashion show of African pattern dresses
With demographic inadequacy in
Western Europe and poverty in Eastern
and Southern Europe, immigration is
going to be increasingly important and it
could act as a lever for cooperation and
development if it is properly designed.
But everyone must be aware of what
everyone else is contributing, otherwise
difficulties of cultural understanding will
be further complicated by biased econ-
omic judgments. 0
J . c. C.
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migration?
International migration brings two
nations into contact with each other and
the bilateral home country-host country
idea WaS the natural approach to it for
many years, However, the field of anal-
ysis broadened when the phenomenon
generalised in the 1950s to mid-1970s and
began to be regulated by conditions on
the employment market in labour-seek-
ing countries in the same region inter alia
Western Europe and the Gulf. There is no
shortage of arguments to prove that the
interdependence of the economies of
North and South is reason enough to take
the world system as a pertinent level of
analysis. However, since both economic
growth and policies in the host countries
are decisive, a world-style approach
could well mask the logic ~ i,e, the
particular concepts institutions and
practices - of each system of migration.
This article is based on experience of
labour markets linking Western Europe,
the Mediterranean and sub~Saharan
Africa  which in no way affects the
specific nature of such conclusions as
may be drawn.
Given that the old countries of immig-
ration have stated their intentions of
keeping their frontiers closed to any
further immigration on a major scale, it is
perhaps worth considering international
cooperation - i.e. opening to trade
capital movements and aid especially 
as an alternative to worker migration.
We shall attempt to answer this ques-
tion by looking at, first, the changes
which have led people to abandon the
idea that migration could help the poor
countries take off in favour of an alter-
native strategy based on international
cooperation, second, the possibility of
migration starting up again and how such
(*) Professor Tapinos teaches at the Paris Institut
Etudes Politiques in France. His article is published
with the agreement of the GECD.
by Georges TAPINOS (*
cooperation would be affected if it did
and, lastly, the conditions and limitations
of an efficient cooperation strategy aimed
at reducing incentives to emigrate.
Emigration and development - a
new paradigm?
History shows emigration to be a
desperate measure; an individual way of
responding to the impossibility of
national development in countries striv-
ing to become rich. Emigration, over~
looked by the classic theory of inter-
national trade and challenged by Mal-
thusianism as a factor which reduces
demographic pressure and lastingly raises
the standard of living, was long con-
sidered as a substitute for development.
More recently, in the 1950s (and until the
frontiers were closed in 1974), when more
workers moved about Western Europe
than ever before, people fondly imagined
or hoped  that the international
mobility of workers might help transmit
development. They saw migration as an
international resource allocation pro-
cedure which both reduced wage gaps
and ultimately did something about the
cause, i.e. the surplus demand for labour
in one group of countries, the North
alongside a surplus of workers and
extremely ill-distributed income and
possessions in the other group, the South.
Emigration from the South both cuts
employment and under-employment and
boosts the marginal productivity of the
non-migrant population. By sending
money home, expatriates increase the
purchasing power of those who stay,
directly in the ca~e of their families and
indirectly in the case df'the rest of the




bution of wealth is improved too. Pro-
ductive use of wage transfers home
encourages capital accumulation and,
ultimately, migrants who come back
familiar with work in industry and
perhaps even professional qualifications
change the system of production. So a
growth process comes about and mig-
ration unites the interests of North and
South.
But there were .sound reasons for
doubting the analysis involving a break in
the assumptions about behaviour and
unheard-of efficiency in the mechanics of
the adjustment behind the phenomenon
- on which this reassuring apologia was
founded. Would migrants aiming to
make their families better off really turn
into investors or captains of industry and
prefer ploughing their savings into pro-
ductive investments to improving their
families' everyday purchasing power?
And why should the resource allocation
processes which were ineffective or mis-
sing at the time of emigration suddenly be
there to help  per capita  GDP improve?
What has always happened is that the
facts of the migratory movements have
tempered optimism, as the migrants and
their families have seen their situations
bettered, but there has been no significant
effect on the critical variables of develop-
ment in the home countries.
Trade and investment as an
alternative to emigration
In the mid 1970s, changes to the
domestic and international economic
environment (with the arrival of the baby
boom generations on the employmeQ.t
market, more women working, a change
in supply behaviour, slower economic
growth and the reorganisation of indus-
try) and an awakening to the dynamics of
migration (family grouping attendant on
worker entry, higher social spending and
ethnic diversification) induced the coun-
tries of immigration to close their fron-
tiers, triggering a problem of substitution
and deloeation, There was mention of a
new international division oflabour, with
a reduction in the numbers of foreign
workers and a go-home incentive policy,
with national workers replacing foreign
ones, various activities being shifted to
the Third World, a return to speeial-if.
Young Arabs in the northern area of Brussels.
The presence  0.(  foreigners (in the Community) should, even without newcomers, be
taken  ill  to account  gillen  the Ilatul"al growth of immigram' populations
isation reflecting the natural distribution
of input, the development of trade and a
growth in investment in the poor coun-
tries. The nature of the projected changes
was not entirely unambiguous, for it was
as much a question of anticipating the
consequences of closed frontiers as 
imagining what the desired changes
actually  ought  to be. Butit is important to
remember that, at the time, when econ-
omic growth was on the wane, employ-
ment was decreasing and unemployment
was rising, the idea of migration starting
up again seemed entirely out of the
question and, to some, for good and
all.
This new 'international division of
labour' did not live up to expectations as
far as the old countries of emigration
were concerned. Much was made of
attempts to relocate some industries there
using returned emigrants and financial
help from the ex-host countries, but the
-----_.
disappearance of the expression itself is
sufficient indication of what happened
and confirms the trend in the economic
indicators. Many countries of the South
put up a poor economic performance in
1973-86 and the rate of growth in most
countries of sub-Saharan Africa over the
period as a whole was negative. The
Mediterranean countries fared better, but
North Africa, despite an improvement in
per capita  product, failed to generate
enough growth in its agricultural product
and had an industrialisation policy which
was unable to absorb unempl9YI?ent and
under-employment. There was no nar-
rowing of the gap between town and
country, that critical factor in dom'estic
and international migration, while food
dependency worsened and the external
debt grew. This, often dramatic, situation
led to structural adjustment policies. The
international organisations advocated
them to bring about truer prices and cut
back on the public sector and they often
freed more labour than they absorbed.
The social movements which shook some
countries in the Mediterranean (Algeria,
Tunisia and Yugoslavia, for example)
underlined the ever-widening gap be-
tween aspiration and reality - to a very
large extent the consequence of the social
change induced by the emigration itself
and sustained by the maintenance of the
many links with the communities abroad.
So there was ultimately more incentive to
emigrate than before.
Development  aid  makes
emigration less attractive?
Things changed again in the mid 1980s
undermining a complex and sometimes
contradictory series of factors which
heightened uncertainty about the poten-
tial prospects of development. In most of
Western Europe - the EEC and Switzer-
land, let us say ~ the  root  of the problem
was concern about an increase in the
foreign population and the fear that more
clandestine immigration would upset the
social and political balance. In fact,
migration before and after the closing of
the frontiers made a significant contri-
bution to increasing the foreign popu-
lation  which Was of cOurse to  Con-
solidate naturally, even without any new
arrivals from abroad, and both the
perception and the prospects of the future
of migration altered. Two things were
decisive here. Letting in workers in-
evitably also involved letting in their
families to join them, which of course
meant more people on the job market in
time. Once the workers were in, there was
less room for manoeuvre and there were
many attempts at keeping the families out
and bringing in go-home incentive po-
licies. But democratic States have to stop
somewhere and immigration policies
cannot be boxed off from the political
system. Once the workers have arrived
authorities which fear they are losing
control of immigration may well step up
their closed-frontier policy more than is
economically desirable.
This could be beneficial to cooperation
policies from some points of view. The
affirmation of the need for a new inter-
national division of labour when the
frontiers closed in 1974 had more to do
with intent and was also designed to get
over the bad conscience of the developed
world. There is more chance of actually
getting a cooperation .and development
aid policy, aimed at making emigration
The Courier no. 129 September-October ,1991less attractive, to work if it looks as
though it serves the interests of the
developed countries themselves. In this
new economic situation, things would be
fairly clear if the idea was to prevent all
forms of immigration, but, today, as
happened before 1973 some  countries
(Germany, Switzerland and soon many
more) are finding tension on their job
markets, with demand greater than
supply. Fresh arrivals are not excluded
provided numbers and characteristics can
be kept under control. The problem is no
longer one of substituting trade and
capital flows for immigration, but of
encouraging aid and keeping a certain
amount of immigration  something
particularly difficult to achieve now that
on top of the endogenous factors en-
couraging the flow to increase again
there are exogenous factors too. Among
the most unambiguous indications in this
area are the exceptionally large increase
in the number of people applying for
asylum (121 000 in Federal Germany in
1989, for example) and the extent of
unemployment among migrants officially
settled (60 % of the workers officially
assimilated in Italy in 1986-87 for ex-
ample, were jobless).
Things are changing in a new context.
Following the idea that take-off in the
countries of origin would be helped first
by emigration and then by the develop-
ment of trade and capital flows coupled
with the resettlement of returned emigr-
ants, the view now is that cooperation
policies which foster development in the
poor countries and keep the population
at home will make emigration less attract-
ive and retain the possibility of partly
opening the frontiers again  to  avoid I
tension on the labour market. 
The Community s big date 
1993
The second point  to  remember is that
the Single Market comes into being on I
January 1993. What the Community has
said about this is at total variance with the
fears of the countries of the South.
Although the Single Market only affects
them indirectly, the relations of depen-
dence and the amount of trade involved
are enough to make them very worried.
More than half of sub-Saharan Africa
exports go to the European Community
and 65% of its imports come from it.
Although its share of exports to the EEC
-------
followed much the same trend from 1975
to  1983, its share of imports from the
EEC increased considerably. A look at
the situation by country and by product
shows that the general effect of the Single
Market (mainly from the harmonisation
of VAT and the laying down of common
standards) should be moderate and in any
Case not involve any trade diversion.
However, inferring that greater demand
in the EEC countries (as a result of
greater growth) would have a significant
effect on sub-Saharan Africa s exports to
the EEC is, bearing in mind the minimal
elasticity of the commodities which make
up the bulk of them, indulging in mere
speculation.
Trends in invisibles should vary. Tour-
ist earnings should grow as Africa be-
comes more competitive than Southern
Europe, while transfers from emigrants
are expected to decline as the movement
slows down, people stay away longer and
many of them settle abroad for good.
Third countries are particularly worried
about private investments, fearing that
political instability and an uncertain
economic future will lead investors to
prefer the Community, where there are
benefits to be had from the Single
Market. And investors have never had a
preference for the former countries of
emigration.
How will 1993 directly affect mig-
ration ?Understanding the implications
for the international movement oflabour
involves looking at Europe s timetable I
for economic unification. Obstacles 
(tariff barriers and quotas) to the free I
movement of goods were in fact removed I
before the free movement of workers was
organised, with more intra-Community
trade and fewer differences in standards
of living as a result. This in turn made
emigration look less attractive and con-
verging economic trends, and a decline in
fecundity in the South especially, en-
hanced the tendency. Ultimately, the
Treaty of Rome reduced the incentive for
Community nationals to move about
within the Community, in accordance
with the customs unioii' t'heory.
At the same time, trade wJt.Jain the
Community increased to the detriment
(in relative terms at least) of trade with I
third, less developed countries. Emi- '
gration  to  the EEC, which they saw as a I
way of overCOming their commercial 
disadvantage. was possible until the mid-
1970s thanks to the heavy demand for,
labour in the Community, where the
percentage of foreigners from third coun-
tries (including Greece, Portugal and
Spain at the time) rose considerably.
The same is bound  to  happen in the
future. The Single Market will  not  ge-
nerate any major increase in the number
of wage-earners who move about the
Community, but there will be more
immigration from third countries, par-
ticularly since the countries of Southern
Europe are in fact permeable in this
respect.
The limits to the closing of
frontiers
The conditions for a resurgence of
migration are there but does this mean
that it will actually happen? The answer
now and in the future, will depend on the
developed countries of Western Europe.
The efficiency of frontier-closing policies
is likely to be impeded by three things 
the new ways the labour markets work
the shifting of the demarcation line
between Northern and Southern Europe
and the refugee admission procedures.
Will they weaken or reinforce cooper-
ation policies?
In the years when growth was strong,
immigration reflected a world-wide em-
ployment market imbalance and the
demand for foreign labour might have
been expected to disappear when the
1970s were over and unemployment
increased. However, there were profound
changes to the employment market at the
same time, with, in particular, more part-
time work, more sub-contracting and an
extension of the informal economy. They
were a reflection of the way the produc-
tion system was organised and not the
result of immigration, but they do explain
a demand for foreign labour in some
sectors at a time of mounting unemploy"
ment.
Europe s North-South divide has shif-
ted and the southern countries  Italy,
Greece and Spain which were formerly
places of emigration  par excellence have
become countries of immigration in their
turn. For the past few years, they have
had foreign workers coming in, some-
thing they were never prepared for and
find difficult  to  cope with, and although
they have made the relevant legal ar"
rangements recently, their attitude is very
much shaped by the tradition of defend-
------------.._--------------------------- - - --- ------- ::;
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Apart from the clothing and the arts industries, the immigrant population has
pl'Ovided the Community with a considerable increase ill imports of tropical
foodstuffs, This pictltre, taken in Bf'ussels, shows that products such as the African
gooseberry, also known as the Cape gooseberry 01' Physalis (left), cllrambola, also
called stal' fruit (right),  Wi  well as goym'e and dwwf bananas are FUJW commonly
found in retail shops
ing their own emigrants. The countries of
Southern Europe could be the way in for
migrants, following the tradition of
certain sectors of activity.
The last thing is the influx of people
wanting asylum. The closing of the
frontiers, which leaves the potential
migrant no other choice than to enter
illegally and ask for asylum, has de-
stroyed the traditional distinction be-
tween political and economic migration.
Although the division was never entirely
watertight, it was not without its  raison
etre.  By proclaiming liberal policies and
giving applicants the maximum guaran-
tees, some States are faced with a major
problem which will of course lead them to
change their regulations in the end. The
fact that appeals against official decisions
to refuse people buy time, encourages
fresh entries, lengthens the whole process
and has the adverse effect of worsening
the situation of genuine refugees. Appli-
cation assessment procedures designed to
handle a few political refugees without
any major risk of error do not work with
large numbers of people from different
parts of the world and without the
information the authorities need to form
,.--_..._- _....._._ _--_.....
a proper judgment. The.;ountries con-
cerned are very worried about this and
have taken steps to speed up the pro-
cedures and put a limit on acceptances, in
the hope of ultimately looking less
attractive to potential migrants.
Refugees and illegal entrants are in
much the same situation. In many cases
refugees who are refused admission after
months of waiting already have jobs and
have little chance of leaving the country
and the decision makes their situation
illegal. Conversely, the only way open to
illegal entrants who cannot expect to
legalise their situation but want to stay
permanently is in fact to apply for asylum
as refugees.
It is tempting to think that a strategy
based on a cooperation policy and
acceptance of a limited number.9Lim-
migrants would be more promising, but
the opposite is more likely. All things
being equal, as long as going for mobility
makes a share in wealth less improbable
and the time it takes to get it potentially
shorter, even a limited opportunity to
emigrate will still be very attractive. The
, cooperation policy would then make
I departure easier, which is why it may be
... ._ ..__._.~. .....
essential to have the constraint of no
opportunity to emigrate to make cooper.
ation policies efficient. The success of
international cooperation would then
depend on how successful frontier closure
was.
America seems to give the lie to this, for
it both has a policy of cooperation and
trade with the countries of the Third
World and (thanks to the 1965 amend-
ment, reinforced by recent legislation)
maintains a high level of legal immig-
ration. But it is a contradiction only in
appearance. The real comparison with
the European model has to focus on the
migration oflabour from Mexico, one or
two states of Central America and the
Caribbean, which developed outside the
system of preferences along lines similar
to those found in Europe. A similar
dilemma occurs too, as the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 is there
to show. Frontier control and cooper-
ation policy, clearly, are closely linked.
From a strictly economic point of view
mobility of input and free trade in
products can be seen as alternative
strategies leading to an identical result 
greater well-being for the trading part-
ners. In practice, and for reasons which
have as much to do with political and
cultural considerations as with factors
overlooked by economic theory (the
behaviour of potential migrants, for
example), the various strategies have
followed each other according to the
demands of the labour-seeking countries.
The new paradigm which is emerging
looks at the incidence of international
cooperation as an alternative to emig-
ration and at least has the merit of
emphasising that the migration issue is
second to the development issue. Al-
though people tend to move because of
the imbalances between the rich and the
less developed countries and the fact that
they do so improves the resources of both
migrants and their families, development
ultimately, is the only way. Cooperation
policies may well be necessary, but
during the transitional period (which will
probably last a few decades), they are just
as likely to encourage the international
mobility of labour as inhibit it. So
however necessary and complementary
border restriction policies and cooper-
ation policies may be, they will not in
themselves prevent emigration from the
less developed nations to the rich ones
particularly those in Europe.
GT 
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Paris, capital of African culture?
Paris became the capital of African
culture in the early 1980s. A close look at
the phenomenon shows it to reflect a
variety of aspirations but no overall unity
on the part of either Africans or Par-
isians. For the former, it means relations
between the races and cultures and
between the various African immigrants
themselves. Black Mode, for example
which the second generation of West
Indians and Africans borrowed from the
Black Americans, is a direct reaction to
the mounting intolerance which emerged
from the crisis of the 1980s. Black Culture
is for a better understanding of Africa.
World Music, on the other hand, wants to
cross music from the west and elsewhere
but currently mainly from Africa and
France. Lastly, the Congolese Snappy
Dressers, who corne to Paris for their
haute couture fashions, are in fact object-
ng to the 'Uncle Tom' image which they
feel is personified by the Soninka road-
sweepers of the capital.
These cultural developments have af-
fected the Parisians a lot and white
youngsters, for example, are now side by
side with black youngsters in the often
violent Zulu Bands. Typical of the Af-
: riean influence is what is happening in
design, where black models have been a
huge success in fashion parades since the
late 1970s. Paco Rabanne, who is behind
i this movement, uses African girls, he
i says
, because  the colour of their skin gives
them a sensuality white women don t have.
It's true. There are very simple aesthetic
things involved. You don t notice a white
woman s teeth or the whites of her eyes...
Technically, black women s teeth stand out
naturally. What I mean is that there is a
natural contrast in their faces. You see it
straight away..
.'. 
Back in 1982, people
running model agencies were already
saying black is beautiful.  'These girls
aren t just lovely. They are spectacular
long and slender with a bearing and a
silhouette straight from the deserts of
Africa... There is more to it than good
) The author, who is from Congo, is a researcher
at the INST in Paris.
by Remy  BAZENGUISSA GANGA (*
looks. You have to know how to move and,
to these willowy beauties from Burundi and




gests the exotic and it is cleverly done
because, when it comes to morphology,
the criteria and the canons of beauty are
the same as for western models.
r'HstoriCl;((r, Paris has always IJro!'ided a suitable climate for divevsified cldtw'
development, !+"hhili the city, (wd Iii contrast with milch of ,1frica itself; the use of
t ,md music  liS  iiistrl'lHcut!i (If" social aideism has hlo. wmied, Pictured here are
XUirei'iiS (i group d,icil 6iioys graH'iiig b(flueiice in the French capital.Painting and sculpture is the other field
in which African influence is prominent
with various European artists getting
through their crisis years by harking back
to ancient African works. These are
primitive pieces manifesting primary
instincts or expressing feelings of a being
entirely prey  to  primeval, wild and magic
forces, and their inclusion in the highly
controversial Magicians of the Earth
exhibition at the Pompidou Centre in
1989 is telling. The title says it all 
focusing on the ritual function of works
and implicitly making the primitive arts a
reference in the production of visual
objects. However, the attraction of this
sort of art apparently has nothing  to 
with the concerns ofthe artists, but, more
prosaically, with those ofthe art dealers
who have made the thing fashionable.
So, although the various people in,
volved are all under the influence of ~
African culture, their ideological and ~
commercial strategies differ. They cannot 
agree on one image of this culture. The  ff.
urban bands' redevelopment of black
culture has different aims from the
primitivism of Parisian painters and
sculptors. There is no direct link between
the claims of the Snappy Dressers and the
exotic aspirations of the Parisian de-
signers. And first and second generation
African immigrants cannot agree either.
The fact that Paris is, ambiguously
enough, a high spot of African culture is
nothing new. The 'negro vogue' of the
inter-war years and the Paris School'
discovery of what it called negro art at the
turn of the century both helped re-
habilitate African culture and the move-
ment gathered momentum in the 1920s
and 1930s, although by then as part of a
more general move  to  improve the stand-
ing of all things black on all continents. In
a world in the throes of moral, economic
and political crisis, the black contribution
stood for the future of mankind. As a
famous art critic put it in 1929 negro art
is the lifegiving sperm of the Occident and
the blacks indeed represent this future by
virtue of their primitiveness that is  to  say
their spontaneity, their authenticity and
their fraternity in the face of the great
cold dehumanised, ethnocidal, nihilistic
machines of the West.
But let us not forget that, in the eyes of
most  French people, the development of
all things black  goes  hand in hand with
mounting paternalism and racialism
pure and hard. Its effect is enormous
-------------- -- -----..----------- ---------
Afore and more ill the Comnumity the"e
is a sustained illte,'e$t in African
Caribbean and Afro-European music.
Above: a $/lcces$fulrecord shop at PoNe
de  Namu,., B,'u$sels
particularly among the intellectuals and
artists of Paris, who will be echoed by
their opposite numbers from the colonies
- French citizens, no less. Thus, this idea
of black culture as the seed of the future
of mankind was taken up by Sartre and
culminated in some of the claims of
negritude,
Towards Afro-European culture?
The originality of the present move-
ment is rooted in the extent of African
immigration, since immigrants update
the Frenchman s image of Africa, which
is no longer dominated by the idea of
seeking the future of mankirio.\' but by
cultural cross-breeding. The workers
themselves are doing a lot ' for this
resurgence of African culture. The  most
important thing is what this cross,
breeding means and what it represents to
the people calling for it. We shall in-
vestigate the French point of view solely
to  see how the French are evolving in
I relation  to  the cultural forms of Africa.
- - ------------- -------
--~---- _m_____
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Pop music is a fine example and a good
illustration of the problem. African
musicians have to  go  to Paris. Most
famous artistes stay there for a while, but
the  most  important thing is  to  produce
records (etc) there, as the working  con-
ditions in the Paris studios are the best.
Above all, artistes emigrate in search of
international fame and there are leading
French musicians  Pierre Vassiliu
Jacques Highelin, Bernard Lavilliers
Alain Bashung and so on  to record
.. with them or take care of their arrange-
ments. French song-writers are looking
for African rhythms which, they main-
tain, are closer  to  primary vital forces and
they want them  not to  devalue African
culture but  to  add to French music. If
there is still any misunderstanding as to
the aims of the African and French
musicians  the former are looking for
international acclaim and the latter for
universality through a merging of cul-
tures.
This quest for cultural intermingling is
more global and it affects the popular
perception of African music. In spite of
the fact that immigrant African mu-
sicians are united in their aims, they
express different cultural experiences
when they play, The  most  commonly
broadcast music in France only features
two countries of West Africa  Senegal
and Mali - and the best-known artistes
are Toure Kunda (Senegal), Mory Kante
(Guinea), Salif Keita (Mali) and
Youssouf N'Dour (Senegal). This West
African music, typically, is a successful
marriage of European and African in-
struments (the Kora, the balafon etc) and
of voices influenced by African folksin-
gers and Islam far from being just
traditional, it is the fruit of a perpetual
reinterpretation of contributions from
outside.
However, contrary to what one might
think, this is not the music  most  Africans
listen  to,  for best-loved in the French-
speaking countries is music from Central
Africa, especially Zaire and Cameroon.
There are artistes from these countries in
Paris  too but they never reach the
popular TV or radio channels.  Yet  they
are on in the capital, playing at dances
and drawing in Africans and more and
more Parisians, and the western influence
on their music is increasing  too.  They
only play western instruments and their
singing bears the mark of Christian choirs
borrowings triggered not by alie-
ThcCourierno 119 September-October 1991I nation, but by a desire to use playing and
dancing  to  express another kind of
autonomous African cultural experience
by impregnating and reinterpreting cul-
tural patterns of the West.
Their lack of success is surprising on
more than One count. Some of the well-
known musicians, including the great
Kane and Manu Dibango, were already
forming the African Jazz Group ~ which
did not have much of a following or any
influence on the French ~ in Paris back
in the 1960s. And in the early 1970s, Tabu
Ley (Zaire) was the first African to be
, invited  to  play at Olympia, attracting
very few connoisseurs, while Manu Dib-
ango was the first African to play in the
- United States, at Carnegie Hall in 1972.
If Paris is the capital of African music
as the papers say, one may well wonder
what Africa the French think this means.
Is it an imaginary Africa born of the
problems of immigration oris it an Africa
attracting increasing interest in some of
its cultural and artistic values?
The French listen to quite different
music from the majority of Africans and
this indeed suggests the existence of an
imaginary Africa. It is interesting here
listen to what Maory Kante, currently the
best known African musician in France
(he sold as many records as Michel
Sardou in 1990 and was in the Top  50 
1987), has to say about this. He is
switched on , as they say in the media
and he personifies the French preoccup-
ation with a culture mix and the form this
ought to take.
This idea is crystallised in World
Music. Most of the non-western group
leaders are African ~ Youssouf N'Dour
Ray Lema and SalifKeita, for example 
and they play African instruments and
have .a thorough knowledge of the tradi-
tions of their respective countries. Wodd
Music, on the other hand, is a kind of
immigrant's revenge. 'The  blacks  are
taking the name of France all over the
world today. I  get  reporters from all over
the world coming to talk about World
Music  of which Paris, thanks to one or
two  of us, is now the capital. Somewhere
I've  got the feeling  I'm  workingfor France
says Zaire s Ray Lema.
The resurgence of African culture in
I France only really became important 
years ago when there was a change in the
i status of immigrants and the way they
! were perceived. The immigrants' culture
EI'en ill the fashion world,  the 'Sappers style, which  was  launched  by people  living
beside  the River ('oligO , has  seen  its greatest  success  in Pal'is.
also benefits from the new means of
expression which the free radio law of
1981 brought in, as their music was then
broadcast by channels like Tropic FM
and Radio Nova arid" many French
people discovered an African reality
which metropolitan France h'frti"known
very little about before.
Cultural cross-breeding involves the
precise dose of exoticness which the
French can cope with when they ap-
proach immigrant culture. It is evolution
through assimilation, not acceptance, yet
it is not  to  be viewed as something
negative, for it is the possibility of
genuine mutual understanding and it is
through the redevelopment of primitive
art that Africa s contemporary sculpture
and painting are appreciated. And it is
World Music that is bringing traditional
African sound to the world.
The Africans are no longer ' ashamed' "
of their culture and the French like it
more and more. And the same goes for
African food and cuisine and African
films and plays too...
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